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DEAN INGE AND HIS EXPOSITION OF NEOPLATONI SM
.
OUTLINE
PART ONE - SKETCH OF HIS LIFE.
I. Introduction.
(a) Dean reticent concerning his life story, p.lc.
(b) Lacking in Warm Social Passion, p. lC
.
(c) Emphasis upon Scholarship. p.H.
II. Early Years.
(a) Born at Crayke, Yorkshire, June sixth, 1860. p .12
(b) Scholarly Family. Emphasis on Education, p. 12.
(c) Aristocratic Seclusion. P. 13.
III. Accomplishments in the Field of Scholarship, p.14.
IV. Called to Deanery of St. Paul's Cathedral .r • 15.
(a) Surprise.
(b) Prophecy of Literary Accomplishments, p.15.
(c) Prophecy fulfilled, p.16 -
(c) "quality of Writings, p. 17.
(d) Dean Undemocratic. Lacks Social Passion, p .l n f.
V. Apologies for the Dean. p.Hc.
(a) Contributing Factors. p.£l.
VI. Personal Appearance, p. 22.
VII. A Touch of Warmth and Humor. 22.
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I. Introductory Statement, i . 24 .
l.Plan of paper, p. 24.
2. Standpoint of Dean Inge, a disciple of Plotinus.P.24
.
3. Standpoint of the writer. Personalis t. P. 24.
II. General Introduction. Philos. of Plotinus. Inge.
1. Dean's first interest in Plotinus. Mysticism, p.24.
2. Criticism of NeoKantians. p.25.
3. Influence of Neoplatonism on Traditional Christianity.
p.26.
4. Present Lack of Interest in Plotinus. p.27.
5. Writer's Opinion. Age against Return to Neoplatonism.
(a) The testimony of history, p.27.
6. Appreciation of Neoplatonism.
(a) Caird. Harnack. Troeltsch. Eucken. p.27.
7. Dean's Confidence in Neoplatonism Unfounded, p.29.
III. Survey of the Third Century. P. 3c.
1. Age Barren of Greatness. p.3c.
2. Period of Religious Syncretism, p. 3c.
3. Bigg's Review of the Third Century, p.32.
4. Conclusion, p. 32.
IV. Influence of the Forerunners of Plotinus.
1. No Great Minds between Aristotle and Plotinus. p. 33.
2. Plato, NeoPythagoreans
,
Plutarch, Maxiraius of Tyre,
Apuleius, Numenius, Ammonias Saccas , Hermetic Writings,
Philo, The Gnostics, p. 33.
3. Plato, the Foremost Influence, p. 34 *
«
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Dean Inge's Exposition of The Philosophy of Plotinus.
I. The World of Sense.
1. Types of Triadic Schematism of the Greeks, p. 26.
2. Fundamental Triads.
(a) Absolute, Spirit, Soul. p. 36.
(b) Spirit, Soul, Body. P. 26.
3. Ordered Hierarchy, p. 27.
4. Spiritual World Alone Possesses Reality, p. 37.
5. Phenomenal World. p. 27.
(a) Valuable Contribution.
6. Criticism of Theory of Ordered Hierarchy.
(a) Abstraction, p. 38.
(b) Personality Regarded as an Obstacle. p. 2S
*
(
II. Creation of Matter.
1. Influence of Plato, p. 29.
2. Views of Drs. Schwegler and Rogers . PP-4C , 41
.
3. Christian Doctrine of Creation, p. 42.
(a) Augustine Origen, Scotus Erigena. P. 42.
4. Value of Plotinus 1 View. p. 43.
(a) Refutation of Materialism
(b) Matter Phenomenal.
III. Space and Time.
1. Regarded as Appearance, p. 44 *
2. Conceptual and Perceptual, p. 44.
3. Difficulties in the Problem, p. 45.
i
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4. Plotinus* Constructive Teaching, p. 46.
(a) Willed Change, p. 47.
(b) Not ontologically real. p.48.
5. Criticism, p. 48.
IV. The Soul and Its Immortality. P. 49.
1 . Conceptions Preceding Plotinus. p. 49.
2. Plotinus • View.
(a) Syncretism. p.5c .
(b) Anticipation of Modern Philosophy. p.5o.
(c) The World Soul. p. 51.
(a) Panpsychism. Souls in Vegetables, etc. p.51.
(d) Doctrine of Individual Souls, p.52.
(a) Logoi of Spirits.?. 52.
(b) Criticism of Plotinus. Absorption, p. 52.
(c) Consciousness not Primary, p. 54.
(d) Faculties of the Soul. p. 55.
(e) Descent of the Soul. p. 55.
(e)" All does not Descend- p.56.
3 . Immortality. Plotinus 1 Doctrine. p.57f.
4. Immortality. View of Plato, Aristotle, Stoics. p.57f
5. Center of Plotinus' View. p.59.
(a) Soul Exists in Own Right. p.^C.
(b) Transmigration of Souls, p-61 /
6. Personalis tic Viewpoint. p.61»
(a) Criticism of Plotinus. P. 61.
(b) Stronger Presupposition on Basis of
Personality, p. 61.
<
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V. The Spiritual World.
1. Terms - Spirit, Spiritual Perception, Spiritual
World, p. 62
.
(a) Spirit and Absolute, p. 64.
(b) Fluid Conception of Soirit and Spiritual World.
p. 64.
( c) Criticism, p. 65
.
2. Categories of Spiritual World. P. 65.
(a) Plotinus Inconsistent, p.65.
(b) Error in Conception of Eeing. p. 66"
3. The Same and Other.
(a) The Task of Soul and Spirit to Unify, p. 66.
(b) Spirit is All Things, p. 66.
(c) Antithesis of Same and Other Transcended in
Spirit, p.67.
4. Movement and Stability.
(a) Complementary Ideas, p. 67.
(b) Doctrine of Ideas. pj68.
(c) Plotinus' View Unsatisfactory, p.68.
5. The Great Spirit and the Individual Spirits.
(a) Hierarchical Conception, p.6?.
(b) Great Spirit Supra-personal. p.7c.
VI. The Absolute .p. 71
.
1. Bradley is Guide, p.71.
2. In Dialectic Plotinus Follows Plato, p. 71.
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(a) Not the Numerical One. p.7 2.
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4. The One as Beyond Existence.
(a) Guiding Principles, p.72 *
(b) History of the Doctrine, p. 72.
(c) What Can Be Said of Absolute - Nothing, p. 74.
(c)" Selections from Enneads . p.73f.
(d) Criticism of Plotinus. p. 74.
5. The One as Infinite. P. 74.
(a) Both the One and Matter Infinite, p. 74.
(b) The Pact of Limit and the Act of Limiting, p.75.
6. The One as First Cause and Final Cause.
(a) Plotinus Asserts Causality of the Absolute, p.76
(b) Theory of Creation, p.76.
(c) Criticism of Theory, p.76.
7. The Vision of the One .P. 78.
(a) Ecstasy No Part of System of Plotinus. p.78.
(b) The Ultimate Doctrine of Neoolatonic Metaphysics
P- 78.
(b)"We can toiow the Unloiowable. p.78.
(b)" "Excerpts from Enneads. p>79f.
(c) The Mystical Experience, p. 83.
(a) No Complete Union, p.83.
(b) Schwegler's View. p.83.
(c) Ecstasy a Part of the System, p.84.
(d) No Self-Hypnotism, p.85.
(e) Criticism, p. 85.
*
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8. Concluding Statements Concerning the Absolute. p.86
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(a) Plotinus Absolute an Abstraction.
(b) Dr.Khudson's Conception of the Absolute, p.86.
(b)" Agnostic. Logical. Causal, p. 86.
(c) Dr. Brightman's Statement, p.86.
(d) Dr. Marlatt's Statement, p.87.
(e) Dean Inge's Statement. 1.87.
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VI I. Ethics and Religion.
A. Ethics.
1. Close connection between Ethics and Metaphysics.
p. 88.
2. Plotinus ' View. - Three Stages, p. 88.
(a) Purification, p. 88.
(b) Enlightenment, p. 89.
(c) Unification, p. 89.
3. Criticisms of Plotinus' Ethics.
(a) Lack of Appreciation of the Body. p. 89.
(b) Moral Isolation of Neoplatonic Saint. p. 9c.
(c) Failure of Ethics Due to Faulty Metaphysics.
. p . 9C .
B. Religion.
1. Crude Spiritism - Inherited Tradition, p. 91.
(a) Popular gods. p. 91.
(b) Stars Divine, p. 91.
(c) The World a Third God. p. 91.
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2. Conception of Prayer. P« 91 «
(a) Approach Higher Spirits by Contemplation
and Meditation. No Petitions, p. 91 •
(b) Object of Prayer. One with Being Addressed, p.91
(c) Approach Lower Spirits by Petition. p.9l»
(c)" A Branch of Sympathetic Magic. F« 91 «
(c)"" Opens Door to Superstition. P» 91 *
(d) Distinctions in Divine Hypostases in
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3. Comparison of Neoplatonism and Christianity.
(a) Criticism by Eucken and Baron von Hugel.p.92f.
(b) Criticism by Augustine, p. 94.
(c) Concluding Criticism of Plo tinus .p. 9 5
.
VIII. General Summary and Conclusion, p. 95.
A.Marks of Strength.
1. Por Historian. p. 95
.
(a) Neoplatonism an Aid in Study of Traditional
Christianity, p. 95.
(b) Special Interest for Those Who Emphasize
Traditional in Religion. p. 9 5.
(c) Interest here Chiefly Historical, p. 9 ^.
2. Neoplatonism Helps Forward to a Clearer Under-
standing of the Phenomenal ity of Matter. p. 9 6
(a) Interest Here Chiefly Historical . p. 96
.
(b) Conception of Matter Not Clear. r. 9^.
I1
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3. Important in Helping to Right View of Soul. p. 96 .
(a) Stresses Immateriality of Soul and Soul's
Independence, p. 96.
(b) More Secure Basis for Immortality . P. 96
.
4. Important in Study of Mysticism, p.96.
(a) Metaphysics of Mysticism not Accepted. P. 96
.
(b) Dr. Jones' Statement. p. 96.
5.Dr. Harnack's Appreciation. p. 97.
B. Marks of Weakness.
1. Keoplatonism in Error Concerning Nature of Reality
in Holding that Reality is Fundamentally Impersonal.
P. 97.
(a) Leads to Abstraction.
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3. Ethics of Neoplatonisra Faulty Beyond Repair, p.- 6 -
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PART 0MB
Dean Inge and His Exposition of Neoplatonisra.
In his latest book, "Labels and Libels", Dean Inge says,
"No biography of me shall ever be written, if I can prevent it."l
He proceeds to give a few reminiscences in which it is his avowed
purpose to say as little about himself as may be possible. This
spirit of diffidence and independence, it seems, may be taken as
almost characteristic of the great Dean of St. Paul's. He appears
as one who is deeply absorbed in contemplation. From time to time
he emerges long enough to pronounce some worthwhile judgments upon
men, times, and institutions but he gives one not the slightest
hint that he ever has or ever shall become the personal champion
of a cause of right or the personal opponent of a present course
of wrong doing. He reminds one of Henry Adams whose "Autobiography"
reveals him as a viewer and a reviewer of great movements in so-
ciety but he himself is just standing outside the circle unper-
turbed and untouched. Tnere is a certain aristocratic aloofness
in Dean Inge that may be said to be almost characteristic. While
the above characterization may be a little overdrawn, it is the
feeling of the writer that any careful study of the Dean's
writings will reveal that a warm social passion is not an out-
standing characteristic. He makes weighty, and worthwhile pro-
nouncements upon topics varying from that of the Philosophy of
Plotinus to "Birth Control", and "Social Life in the Next Hundred
1. Inge - Labels and Libels p. 248.
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Years" yet these are pronouncements of a cool outsider, lacking
in a broad human sympathy such as one would find in a man living
close to the anxious heart of the race.
There is an old adage, "It is a cold wind that blows nobody
good", and the fact that Dean Inge lacks in sympathy for the race
may be turned to good account in many ways. For example, St-
Francis of Ass is i would have made a sorry mark in the business
world, yet his lack here is more than compensated for in his de-
votion to his lady poverty. Paul says that he became all things
to all men which was a good principle for Paul in the light of his
basic purpose, but Dean Inge in the light of another purpose, re-
fuses to become all things to all men. Both principles are justi-
fiable provided that the purpose be noble. For the Dean, the pur-
pose seems undoubtedly to be that of painstaking scholarship.
Dean Inge is first a scholar and everlastingly a scholar. Few
modern writers give more convincing proof of intimate contact
with the mind of the age and with the mind of the ages. It is
only natural that the Dean of St. Paul's should give us a fine
example of scholarship for he comes of a line of scholars. He
says "My grandfather, Edward Churton, Archdeacon of Cleveland,
and for forty years rector of Crayke, was an old-fashioned
scholar and divine, author of 'The Early English Church', then
the best popular book on the subject; of 'The Cleveland Psalter',
a metrical version of the Psalms; of two volumes of poems, and of
a learned work on the Spanish poet Gongora, which is still quoted
with respect by students of Spanish He lived mainly in his
library, well stocked with folios of theology, including all the
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verbose Fathers of the Churcn, and all the Anglo- Catholic
divines from the Laudians to Pusey".l
His father, William Inge, who married the only daughter of
Edward Churton, was a fellow of his college and had been the fast
bowler on the Oxford Eleven. He came to Crayke as tutor to the
Archdeacon's sons, three of whom won scholarships at Eton, and
the fourth was nominated to the foundation at Charterhouse. My
father served as curate at Crayke, refusing preferment, till the
Archdeacon died in 1874; after which he held a living in Staf-
fordshire, till he was appointed Provost of Worcester College in
Oxford in 1881 and soon afterwards was offered the bishopric of
Salisbury. This last honor so shocked his modesty that he re-
fused by return of post, without even telling his wife." 2. Thus
on both sides Dean Inge comes of studious ancestors.
Concerning His Early Years.
The Dean of St. Paul's was born at Crayke, Yorkshire, June
sixth, 1860. These were years of what might be called splendid
isolation. He tells us that Crayke was "very much cut off from
the world". 3. The chief means of travel to York was behind two
fat horses, which covered the distance in two hours. Railroad
travel was considered dangerous and he says that they were
taught to say their prayers with extra care before embarking on
a journey by train. Such excitements were few and far between.
The family had hardly any neighbors. He says that his parents
had abundant leisure which they devoted to the education of their
1. Inge. Labels and Libels p. 235.
2. » » " p. 236.
3. " » » » p. 234.
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children. This education consisted in reading aloud end "copy
drawing". The children at an early age were introduced to
Shakespeare, Spenser, Tennyson, Sir Walter Scott, and several
books on history. Concerning this early education he says, "The
excellence of my father's classical teaching may be judged from
the success of the young Churtons, and from ray position as second
on the list of Eton Scholars after only three months at a prepara-
tory school. We had indeed a splendid education, such as no
children get in these days." 1.
Practically the only excitement in the community was a
cricket match which was won by the Oxford Blues. Sunday was
what he calls a "Mitigated Puritan Sabbath". They were not al-
lowed to play the same games that were played on week days. Prom
tne brief description of these years at Crayke one gets the im-
pression that they were not overpleasant. The bright spot seems
to be his memory of his early education under his father. It is
easy to understand how his early years were a definite influence
in determining what his work should be. The emphasis on religion
and the emphasis on education were the determining factors. One
gets the impression that his early life was given over chiefly to
preparation for "the examinations", a preparation that was en-
joyed, one suspects, because there seemed to be nothing else to
do. These years of isolation at Crayke, may also account for
some of the Dean's seeming lack of passion for humanity. He
seems to have been brought up in an atmosphere of aristocratic
seclusion, having few or no contacts with what Lincoln calls the
1. Inge. Labels and Libels p. 237.
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coramon people- On this point it is of interest to note that
Harold Begbie, that champion of the soul of the common man, says
of him: "He thinks of mankind with interest, not with affection.
Humanity is a spectacle, not a brotherhood." After quoting the
Dean to the effect that 'there is not the slightest probability
that the largest crowd will ever be gathered in front of the nar-
row gate', he adds: "Still one could wish that he felt in his
heart something of the compassion of his Master for those who
have taken the road to destruction." 1.
The emphasis upon education in the Dean's early life leads
one to anticipate rare accomplishments in the field of scholar-
ship. There is not the slightest evidence thet these anticipa-
tions have not been fully realized. Dean Inge is first of all a
scholar. His essays upon general themes and his contributions
to the field of scholarship reveal that he has been on long jour-
neys in company with the greatest minds of the ages. He is pain-
staking to the last degree and his attainments are little short
of marvelous. The following list of educational accomplishments
is taken from "Who's Who 1930 English edition": Eton, Kings Col-
lege, Cambridge, Bill Scholar Porson Prizeman, 1880: Porson
Scholar 1881: Craven Scholar and Browne Medallist 1883: First
Class Classics 1882 and 1883: Hare Prizeman 1885: Assistant Mas-
ter at Eton 1884-1388: Fellow of King's 1886-1388: Fellow and
Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford 1889-1904: Select Preacher at
Oxford 1393-1395, 1903-1905, 1920-1921: Cambridge, 1901, 1906,
1910, 1912, 1913, 1920, 1924: Bampton Lecturer 1899: Honarary D.D.
1. Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 41.
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Aberdeen 1905: Paddock Lecturer, New York, 1906: Lyman Beecher
Lecturer, Yale, 1925: Vicar of All Saints, Ennisraore Gardens,
S.W., 1905-1907: Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Fellow
of Jesus College, Cambridge, of Hertford College, Oxford, and
of King's College Cambridge: Academic Committee of Royal Society
of Literature: Gifford Lecturer, St. Andrews 1917-1918: Romanes
and Hibbert Lecturer, 1920: Rede Lecturer, 1922: Huldean Lecturer,
1926: Honorary D. of Lit., Aberdeen 1920: Sheffield 1924: Honorary
L.L.D. Edinburgh, 1923: Trustee of National Portrait Gallery, and
since 1911 Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral. In line with this edu-
cational triumph, Harold Begbie in "Painted Windows" says, "There
is no greater mind in the Church of England, no greater mind, I am
disposed to think, in the English nation. His intellect has the
range of an Acton, his forthrightness is the match of Dr. Johnson's
and his wit, less biting though little less courageous than Vol-
taire's, has the illuminating quality if not the divine playfulness
of the wit of Socrates." 1. These are words of high praise yet
they do not overstate the fact of the tremendous versatility and
penetrative power of the mind of Dean Inge.
He says that the letter of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister,
offering him the Deanery of St. Paul's was a 'staggering surprise'.
In his offer Mr. Asquith hoped that the new dean would revive the
old traditions of the Deanery of St. Paul's 'as the most literary
appointment in the Church of England !• I was to remember Milraan,
Mansel, and Church and to justify ray appointment by taking a promi-
nent part in the world of literature, scholarship, and theology." 2
1. Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 45-
2. Inge. Labels and Libels, p. 257.
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That the Dean of St. Paul's has justified this appointment is an
unquestioned fact. He has proved to be a most prolific writer
dealing with themes ranging from the popular to those requiring
profound critical scholarship. The announcement of a new book by
Dean Inge is a matter of international interest. An example of
this interest came to the attention of the writer in connection
with the Dean's book, published in America under the title, "Labels
and Libels." This same book was published in England under the
title "Assessments and Anticipations". In inquiring for the book
under the English title the writer discovered, upon examining the
table of contents, that the books differed in title only. This
came as a surprise to the clerk in a popular bookstore in Boston,
who, upon inquiry, found that only that morning they had received
twenty copies of the English edition which were bought to sell a t
a price greatly in excess of that of the American publication. He
explained the mistake as due the practice of the store which was
to order immediately any book by Dean Inge. In the terms of a
line of popular advertising, one is forced to say "Such popularity
must be deserved".
The following works listed in the English edition of "Who's
Who" 1930 furnish convincing evidence that Dean Inge has carried
out the wishes of Prime Minister Asquith in the line of literary
activity: Society in Rome Under the Caesars 1886. Eton Latin
Grammir (with F.H.Rawlins) 1889. Third Edition 1900. Christian
Mysticism, 1899. Two essays in Contentio Veritatis, 1902. Faith
and Knowledge, 1904. Selections from German Mystics, 1904.
Studies of English Mystics, 1906. Truth and Falsehood in Religion,
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1906. Personal Idealism and Mysticism, 1907. Faith, 1909.
Speculum Aniraae, 1911. The Church and the Age, 1912. Types
of Christian Saintliness, 1915. The Philosophy of Plotinus, 1913.
Outspoken Essays, 1919. Second Series, 1922. The Idea of Pro-
gress—Romanes Lecture - 1920. The Victorian Age (Rede Lecture)
1922. Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion, 1924. The
Platonic Tradition, 1926. England, In Modern World Series, 1926.
Lay Thoughts of a Dean, 1926. The Church and the World, 1927.
Assessments and Anticipations, 1929, and some School Books. Here
is a list of more than twenty-five publications from the pen of
Dean Inge. Eleven of these were published before he came to St.
Paul's. It will be recognized that his greatest work has been dene
since he came to the Deanery. His friend and fellow countryman,
Harold Begbie, says that it was not until he came to St. Paul's
that the world realized the greatness of his mind and the rich-
ness of his genius. 1.
The Dean's writings have a quality not usually met in modern
writers who are widely read. There is always the evidence of
careful scholarship. His sentences have a certain bristling qual-
ity that arouses the reader. He is sincere in his statements.
Indeed this note of sincerity may be said to be characteristic
of all his work. Here he is not unlike his patron saint, Plotinus,
whose biographer says that he never wrote an insincere word.
Another quality found in his work that is commendable, is that he
never beclouds his position or his conclusion by meaningless sen-
tences. In his study of Plotinus, for example, he reveals at
1. Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 42.

-13-
once that his position is that of a disciple and not that of a
mere critic. His chief works are written almost wholly from the
standpoint of Neoplatonism as examplified in the works of Ploti-
nus. There is another characteristic of the Dean's work that
without doubt, accounts for his being so widely read and that is
his courage. Every age needs men who, having thought things
through, are willing to stand alone if need be, and declare what
for them is the truth. There is no doubt as to the Dean of St.
Paul's on this point. For example as already indicated, he takes
his position in favor of Neoplatonism. He states his case as t
o
the basic worth of Neoplatonic philosophy and faces the world.
If the world agree with him so much the better, but if not h
e
holds fast. The same is true with reference to Mysticism, to
his strictures on democracy, to his disbelief in progress, to
his belief in birth control, to his non-acceptance of the funda-
mentalist position, and likewise to his non-acceptance of the
modernist view. He knows, and so does the world, where he stands
upon the question of England bowing to the Pope. He has a view
as to the theology of the church, and states it. The free
churches, the high church, all come in for their part of com-
mendation or censure. In his prognostications, he sees England
no longer a nation of the first rank, but doomed to occupy a
secondary place amoung the world powers. 1. This quality of
mind reveals him to be thoroughly awake, and accounts somewhat
for the sobriquet, "The Gloomy Dean" that, the writer thinks,
1. Inge. Labels and Libels p. 138
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has not been wholly justified. In a fine paragraph, Harold
Begbie, truly says, "Dr. Inge has thought things out; everything
in his faith has been thought out; and the basis of all his think-
ing is acceptance of absolute values - absolute truth, absolute
goodness, absolute beauty. No breath from class rooms agitated
by Einstein can shake his faith in these absolutes. His spirit
of the Universe is absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute
oeauty. He is a Neoplatonist, but something more. He ascends
into communion with this Universal Spirit whispering the Name of
Christ, and by the powers of Christ in his soul addresses the
Absolute as Abba, Father." Yet, and Begbie adds (and note its
significance, "No man is freer of bigotry or intolerance, though
not many can hate falsity and lies more earnestly." 1.
There is one quality in which the Dean's writings are ser-
iously lacking, and that is the social note. He is undoubtedly
an individualist. There is little evidence of great social pas-
sion. He has thought things through for himself and he is wil-
ling to let those who can, do the same. How strange it is to
find a man of the Dean's breadth of intellect and power lacking
in appreciation for the great principle of Democracy. He says,
"Democracy in America means anything or nothing at all, which
makes it an excellent slogan." 2. He makes the statement that
the rich, never liked it or believed in it, that the middle class,
would prefer almost any other form of government, that the labor-
ing class used it as an instrument to destroy privilege, but is
now thoroughly out of patience with it. 3. Of course, there is
1.
2.
3.
Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 37.
Inge. - Labels and Libels p. 154.
it n mm p. 154.
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no denial that Democracy as we know it, has its faults but in
the light of what history reveals with reference to other forms
of government that have had much greater opportunity to justify
themselves, one is justified in believing that the Dean is here
speaking out of his prejudices.
In the same spirit he attacks Socialism, Labor Governments,
Industrialists as the 'bete noire' of true government. Here of
course, the Democratic principle is deeply involved and such
movements are therefore especially offensive to the Dean. It
would seem however to an unprejudiced observer that all of these
movements, so common today, could not be dismissed with a word.
While no one would be so foolish as to approve all the ideas or
wild Utopian programs coming from these groups there are, with-
out doubt underlying ,co ndi t ions that have brought these movements
into being, conditions that at least demand sympathetic investi-
gation. Someone has said of Tschai kowsky 's music that the groans
of the Russian peasants, suffering centuries of injustice run
through it all. So it seems to the writer that these movements,
wild and extreme as they are, nevertheless give expression how-
ever inarticulate that expression may be, to the fact of exist-
ing injustice in modern civilization that even a half-hearted
Christianity would seek to overcome.
His lack in social passion may be accounted for when one
considers his early life at Crayke. Social contacts were ex-
tremely few. Likewise one gets the impression that his life as
a student did not tend to broaden his mind in this resoect- At
the best the scholar must be somewhat of a recluse. The same
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may be said of his Highchurchmanship. There is another influ-
ence that is even stronger in determining his position here, and
that is his Neoplatonic Philosophy. Here he found the hierarchi-
cal system of his church buttressed by a philosophy to which he
seems even temperamentally disposed. 1. To be a Neoplstonist one
must of necessity be a "lonely soul" making the steep ascent to
the One. As Plotinus stated it, it is the flight of the lonely
soul to the only God. As a disciple of Plotinus whose philosophy
he sees at the basis of all mysticism, he naturally emphasizes the
life of contemplation as the only true means of arriving at Reality
When one brings together the influences of early life, his devo-
tion to scholarship, his Highchurchmanship, his Neop latonic Philo-
sophy, and his natural taciturnity heightened by partial deafness,
this lack of social passion seems only natural.
It remains to be said, however, that whatever may be his
wealmesses, however men may or may not agree with his position,
he is bound to be regarded, and rightly, as one of the strongest
men in his nation. Begbie gives it as his opinion that in the
future men will regard the Dean as possessing something of the
force, richness, and abiding strength commonly associated with
Dr. Johnson. 2.
In philosophy he is a Neoplatonist
,
holding tenaciously to
the position that there is something basic here. In religion he
emphasizes the mystical. Mysticism he defines, as "The attempt
to realize, in thought and feeling, the immanence of the temporal
in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal. "3. In
1.
2.
3.
Philos. of Plotinus Vol.11 p. 162-163
Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 23
Inge - Christian Mysticism, p.
5
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politics he is a conservative, spurning Democracy. Indeed it
appears from his writings that with little persuasion he would
readily account for all the bad government on earth as due to
Democracy. It may be that his disbelief in progress is due to
the fact that this idea is too Democratic.
In appearance the Dean is a typical English Scholar and
Divine. His pictures reveal him to be little different from
such men as Doctor Moffatt and Canon Streeter His friend Harold
Begbie describes him thus: "He is very tall, rigid, long-necked,
and extremely thin, with fine dark hair and a lean grey clean-
shaven face, the heavy- lidded eyes of an almost Asian deadness,
the upper lip projecting beyond the lower, a drift of careless
hair sticking boyishly forward from the forehead, the nose is
thin, the mouth mobile but decisive, the whole set and color of
the face stonelike and impassive
.
n 1
.
One would not expect to find in the Dean of St. Paul's
Cathedral any special emphasis that could be called humorous.
It would seem that this position would bespeak only dignity and
solemnity, and so it does. His writings cannot be said to have
a very definitely humorous quality. Yet, in spite of his high
position he seems to possess a certain quality of droll humor
which from time to time comes to the surface in some sly comment
or issues forth in some shrewd putting of a modern foible.
His friend, Harold Begbie, hints at a humorous quality when
he says "When he smiles, it is as if a mischievous boy looked out
of an undertaker's window; but the smile, so full of wit .mischief
,
1. Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 25.
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and even gaiety, is gone in an instant. "1. We are glad to
close this sketch of the life of one of one of the world's
most noted champion's of Neoplatonism with a touch that re-
veals that he may not be as cold as his impersonal philosophy
might suggest. That there is a warm personal touch in his
makeup is especially evident in his little book "Personal
Religion and the Life of Devotion" . However, he acknowledges
that his Neoplatonic Philosophy does not lay much emphasis
upon personal affection for man or for God. 2.
1. Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 25
2. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.11, p. 162-163.
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PART TWO
Dean Inge and His Exposition of Neoplatonism.
It is the plan of this paper to ooint out the marks of
strength and the marks of weakness in Neoplatonism, following
in particular, the exposition of Neoplatonism as given by Dean
Inge in his two-volume work on Plotinus and in his other writings.
In his exposition of Neoplatonism the Dean of St. Paul's
follows a plan that is highly commendable in that he does not
seek to hide his own position. He states in the very outset that
he approaches the task as an avowed disciple and not as mere stu-
dent and critic. Some of our modern writers on philosophical
subjects might greatly improve their work if they would follow
such a course so that the reader might not be continually in the
dark as to their own position. A striking examole of this rather
fruitless labor is seen in the work "The Story of Philosophy" by
Durant. Here is a work that is greatly lacking in usefulness just
because the author writes from no discernible philosophical stand-
point.
In line with this principle, which seems to be one that has
real value, the writer in such criticism that he may undertake,
writes from the Personalis tic standpoint.
In his introduction to his valuable work, "The Philosophy
of Plotinus", the author reveals that his interest in Plotinus
began while writing his Bampton Lectures on Christian Mysticism
which he delivered at Oxford in 1899. This emphasis upon mysti-
cism is manifest throughout the Dean's work and it is just here
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it seems to me, that his chief interest in Plotinus centers.
He says, "It soon became clear to me that mysticism involves a
philosophy and at bottom is a philosophy. "1. This mysticism he
defines as, "a spiritual philosophy which demands the concurrent
activity of thought, will, and feeling". 2. This activity of
these elements of our personality leads to the goal which of
course, is that man may become effectively a partaker of the
Divine nature. It is significant that he quotes Plotinus to the
effect that the power which leads us up to reality is one which
all possess, though few use. It remains to be said however, that
in actual experience Plotinus found that many ere lacking in the
power to use the power as is evidenced by the fact that he sought
to found "Platonopolis" a community of choice spirits who might
be able to "contemplate" and by "contemplation" arrive at the goal.
He makes short shrift, and rightly, of philosophies such as
Pragmatism, and of theology such as is found in the NeoKantian
Ritschl and his followers. He is right in his insistent empha-
sis that both the starting point and the goal for the Platonist
is the question, 'What is ultimate reality? f 3.
It is interesting to note that in his discussion of the
speculative Mysticism of Spencer, Dean Inge says that Spencer's
Absolute, matter without form, would seem to be identified wi th
the all but non-existing "matter" of Plotinus, rather than with
the superessential "One". "But later Neoplatonists found thera-
1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol. I .p .4
.
2. " " " " I p. 5.
3. " " " " I p. 4.
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selves compelled to call both extremes ^° l*h °* • Plotinus
struggles hard against this conclusion, which threatens to make
shipwreck of his Platonism. " 1. It is only fair to the Dean,
however, in using this quotation to say that he repudiates his
former judgments of Plotinus as being crude and not representing
his mature opinions. 2. These so-called, immature opinions c ome
very near the truth so far as Plotinus' system is concerned. He
does leave us with two extremes both of which are abstractions.
The author places great importance in the fact that Neopla-
tonism is tne constructive effort of seven hundred years of
unimpeded thinking, the longest the race has been permitted to
enjoy. From this he concludes, and rightly, that Neoplatonism
is of great importance in the history both of philosophy and of
theology. Tne re can be no doubt that the historical importance
of Neoplatonism is very great. There is undoubted evidence of
the influence of Neoplatonism in the writings of St. Paul and
St. John. This influence he rightly concludes extends through
Origen, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Auuinas and is a deter-
mining factor in traditional Christian theology. It does not
seem necessary, however, to go to the extreme to which he goes
in agreement with Troeltsch that "the future of Christian philos-
ophy depends upon the renewal of its alliance with Neoplatonism. "3.
The author is right in his declaration that to study Christianity
as a development from the Old Testament background, without recog-
1. Inge - Christian Mysticism. Note p. 98.
2. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.1, note p.l.
3. " " I, 13.12.
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nizing the Greek influence is to have a one-sided view of
Christianity. He regards Christian Platonisra as a continua-
tion, under changed conditions, of the latest phase of Greek
philosophy.
Dean Inge greatly d eplores the lack of interest in Neopla-
tonism. He accounts for this lack of interest, especially in
Plotinus, as due to the reluctance of churchmen to acknowledge
obligations to a Pagan, who was master of the Anti- Christian
apologist, Porphyry. Another reason is found in the difficulty of
reading the Bnneads in the original owing to obscurities of style
and lack of arrangement, not to mention corruptions in the text.l.
The author is unwilling to acknowledge that there are inherent
difficulties in the system which seem to me to be the real cause
for lack of interest. It is difficult to see how this age of
ours could ever become satisfied with a system that finds Unity,
Reality, in a &*re abstraction- Pragmatism itself is a direct
reaction against the abstract conceptions of reality found in
Hegel, and in Bradley. Philosophical systems that find their
source of strength in well buttressed abstractions will hardly
satisfy our age, notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of Dean
Inge.
Among the many names given as speaking highly of the work
of Plotinus, the author especially mentions Hamack, Caird, and
Bucken. These men do speak highly of the work of Plotinus yet
it is because of his historical importance rather than that they
believe that his system is adequate. It is interesting to note
1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol. I. p. 15.
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tiiat these men are among the foremost who charge Plotinus with
metaphysical dualism. He is aware of this, however, and takes
them seriously to task. He thinks that Eucken has not under-
stood the doctrines of the One and the Spirit in relation to
each other; that Caird distorted Plotinus in attempting to make
him fit his Hegelian bed of Procrustes. Harnack, he charges with
prejudice and with little knowledge of the Greeks. As to the
specific charge of dualism I think that the author f s point that
the Bnneads do not reveal Plotinus to have been a dualist is not
strongly sustained. Harnack, however, especially, speaks of
Neoplatonism as a whole, rather than confining himself to Ploti-
nus. The author contends that later Neoplatonism was a corrup-
tion rather than a development of the system. 1.
He places great confidence in tne statement of Troeltsch
to which he refers repeatedly: " In my opinion the sharper stress
of the scientific and philosophical spirit in modern times has
made the blend of Neoplatonism and New Testament Christianity
tne only possible solution of the problem at the present day,
and I do not doubt that this synthesis of Neoplatonism and
Christianity will once more be dominant in modern thought " 2.
This word from Troeltsch is the best possible putting of the
Dean's own position. He not only thinks that Plotinus will
solve the great problems of the world, but private problems as
well. He justifies his work on Plotinus, not on what others say
but upon what Plotinus has done for him. "So it may be that othere
beside myself will find in this prophet of a sad time a helper in
1. Philos.of Plotinus Vol.1, p. 19
2. Troeltsch quoted - Philos.of Plotinus Vol.1. p. 22.
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public and in private sorrows, and that they will say of
Plotinus what he said of his master Ammonius, 'This is the
man I was looking for'."l. Such statements from the Dean of
St. Paul's reveal a genuine sincerity and personal interest in
the work of Plotinus that is shared by very few. Indeed, this
extreme position is a weakness that serves to render his work
obscure. Sometimes it is difficult to discern whether he is
expounding Plotinus* or his own views. Upon this point Harold
Begbie says: "A friend of mine once asked him, 'Are you a
Christian or a Neoplatonist? * He smiled. 'It would be difficult
to say', he replied." 2.
As to his confidence in Neoplatonism and its ability to
solve our problems, I must say that this is an optimism that I do
not share. Harnack's position seems to be nearer the truth when
he says, "Neoplatonism is, on the one side, the completion of an-
cient philosophy, and, on the other its abolition." 3. He shows
that Neoplatonism from the standpoint of religion, rose to great
heights, but in the end superstition overcame it with resulting
barbarism. The testimony of history is difficult to gainsay, and
I fear that any widespread return to a conception of reality so
airy, with its resulting mysticism, would serve to make matters
worse rather than better.
1.
2.
3.
Philos. of Plotinus Vol.1, p. 24.
Begbie - Painted Windows, p. 32
Harnack - Hist, of Dogma Vol.1, p. 336.
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The Third Century.
Dean Inge takes the view that there was only one shining
light in the third century and that was Plotinus. He says,
"Plotinus is the one great genius in an age singularly barren
of greatness." 1. He is equally sure that the Alexandrian philos-
ophy of religion was the one great achievement of "still unex-
hausted richness." 2. He shows that this century was a period
of religious revival. Oriental religions came from Egypt, Syria,
Phrygia, and Palestine. Prom Egypt, the cult of Is is made great
inroads; from Phrygia the worship of the Magna Mater; from Persia,
came Mithraisra with its influence upon Neoplatonism and Christiani-
ty; It was, likewise, a period of religious syncretism with the
temples of the rival faiths standing side by side. While there did
prevail a spirit of toleration, it was also a period of persecu-
tion. Bitter persecution against Christians and Jews arose under
the leadership of Severus, Caracalla, and later under Decius.
Neoplatonism, according to Dean Inge, exerted a tremendous and
lasting influence over Christianity. This influence took the form
of Christianity absorbing Neoplatonic principles. This enabled it
to triumph over Neoplatonism. The inroads of these various faiths
naturally made way for superstition, which according to the author,
served to corrupt Neoplatonism. He seeks to bring out the point
that later Neoplatonism is a corruption of the principles laid down
by Plotinus. He says that the three protagonists, during this cen-
tury were, Plotinus, Origen, and the successors of Valentinus;
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.1, p. 25.
2 . « " » " I . p . 70
.

-31-
representing, respectively Greek philosophy, Hellenised
Christianity, and Hellenised Orientalism. 1. It was this
common debt to Greece that prevented the parties from being
wholly alien to each other, and, hence, made religious Syncretism
possible. He concludes, therefore, that the really great thing
that came out of this century was the emergence of the religious
philosophy of Plotinus with its consequent influence upon the
religious thought of the whole world. He accepts Schmidt's sum-
mary of its characteristics: " 'the union of philosophy and reli-
gion, a strong trend towards system and dogma, mistrust of arid
intellectualism, consciousness of the need of revelation, aspira-
tions after the spiritual life, thoughts of immortality, inward-
ness, purity, mysticism.'" 2.
We appreciate this effort of the author to give us a survey
of the third century in order that we might the more completely
understand the power and importance of Neoplatonism. His claim
that Christianity cannot be adequately understood apart from an
understanding of the influence of Neoplatonism is wholly right.
Anyone who studies the work of Plotinus cannot deny that he rises
to noble heights. Indeed it is significant, as Harnack points out
that this philosophy, judged from the standpoint of religion and
morality, sought to beget and confirm an ethical temper which was
the highest and purest produced by the culture of the ancient
world. 3. It is also significant that notwithstanding these words
of high praise, Harnack considers Neoplatonism, as at the same
time the completion and the abolition of ancient philosophy.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 70.
2. " " " " I. p. 70.
3. Harnack - Hist, of Dogma. Vol.1, p. 336.
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As to the utter barrenness of the third century aside from
the name of Plotinus, one is inclined to think that the name of
Origen is not to' "be classed among those of little influence. In
many ways he proved himself to be as independent and as powerful
in thinking and in influence as Plotinus.
Bigg, in his review of the third century, points out that
the church in previous years had successfully met Gnosticism,
Quartodecimanism, Montanism, and later Novatianism. In this cen-
tury it wrestles with the problem of Unitarianism in the two
forms, Theodotianism and Sabellianism, both of which were con-
demned with the result that it was emphatically declared that the
Christian tradition taught a Trinity of Divine oersons. He fur-
ther mentions developments within the church that have had far
reaching influence such as, severence between clergy and laity,
celibacy of the clergy, further develODment of asceticism, and
finally the struggle with superstition and magic It is his con-
tention that its compromise with superstition here finally led to
the Reformation. 1. In view of the fact that the third century
was a period of extreme persecution, it does not seem quite
the whole truth to class i t as barren in all except its develop-
ment of Neoplatonism. I fear the author is neglecting some power-
ful factors. He neglects the emphasis noted by Harnack who holds,
and I think rightly, that there developed forces that were too
strong for Neoplatonism to survive. 2. I think, however, that
Dean Inge has rendered a distinct service in his emphasis upon
1. Bigg. Origins of Christian! ty. Ch. 38. p. 494
2. Harnack - Hist, of Dogma. Vol.1. p. 386.
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the historical importance of the work of Plotinus. His purpose
in showing the importance of Plotinus in the development of re-
ligious philosophy is indeed a worthy one. Surely it cannot be
gainsaid that in Plotinus we find Greek philosophy becoming in-
tensely religious. This does give Plotinus a secure place in
history, although I fear that the author has overemphasized his
importance as a philosopher for our day.
FORERUNNERS OF PLOTINUS.
Dean Inge emphasizes the point that there were no really
great minds between Aristotle and Plotinus. Plotinus himself,
continually goes back to Plato to whom alone he ascribes plenary
inspiration. It is important to remember this in any attempt to
understand Plotinus. It was not his purpose to go beyond Plato,
although he does mark an advance. This fact of his allegiance
to Plato i s seen in repeated declarations that his doctrines a re
not original. The statement of his position with regard to the
past is unique: " 'This doctrine is not new; it was professed from
the most ancient times, though without being developed explicitly.
We wish only to be the interpreters of the ancients, end to show
by the evidence of Plato himself that they had the same opinions
as ourselves . 1 " 1.
Among the forerunners of Plotinus, he lists the following:
Plato, Neopythagoreanism, Plutarch, Maximus of lyre, Apuleius,
Nuraenius Ammonias Saccas , The Hermetic Writings, Philo, and The
Gnostics. With such a formidable list of forerunners it is in-
l.Bnnead 5.1.8. Philos. of Plotinus Vol. I. p. 110.
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evi table that Plotinus should be called an eclectic. The Dean
shows that some make this charge as a compliment as does Jules
Simon who defines eclecticism to consist in harmonizing and
combining the best of different schools. The term is used as
a reproach in the sense that an eclectic philosopher has a patch-
work mantle. He believes that Plotinus is not consciously an
eclectic in either sense. He constantly goes back to Plato and
would have been pleased with Augustine's word that 'in Plotinus,
Plato lived again I His reverence for Plato is typical of his
spirit towards the past. He appealed to Plato, refusing to be
called an Academic, and likewise was reluctant to point out er-
rors in other 'ancient philosophers of blessed memory." 1.
From other philosophers he shows that Plotinus obtained
much for which little or no acknowledgment is made. He accounts
for this on the basis that it is due to the interchange of ideas
between the Academy and the Peripatetics before Plotinus, to his
jealousy of the Athenian School. He admits little from the
Pythagoreans that had not been admitted by Plato. Prom the Stoics
he received much although he was openly hostile to them. The
author notes that the so called dynamic pantheism as charged by
Zeller and others, the doctrine that living forces of the Deity
permeate nature, is Stoical. This doctrine he repudiates, so far
as Plotinus is concerned, on the ground that for Plotinus the
world is immanent in God, not God in the world. 2. From the
Stoics he obtained his idea that Matter, so far as it exists is
1. Bnn.3.7.1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.1 p. 109.
2. Note Philos. of Plotinus Vol.1, p. 112.
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created by God and from them he obtained the terms \o} o HnljTr t
+
Likewise he is indebted to the Stoics for his ethics as mani-
fested in indifference to external interests and emphasis upon
the subjective condition of the individual. His opposition to
Stoicism and kindred theories is explained in the Fourth Ennead
in which he says that 'it is a radical mistake to explain the
higher by the lower and that the merely potential can of itself
develop actuality. ' 1.
He attempts to explain away the influence of the sceptical
developments of Platonism upon Plotinus. He acknowledges a
sceptical element in Plotinus but likens it to what he calls • the
so- called scepticism of Bradley. He approves Ho'ffding's statement
that scepticism is not Bradley's point of view but that he should
be called a mystic. "Our thought is always aspiring to something
which is more than thought, our personality to something more than
personality, our morality to something higher than all morals." 2.
The author considers this position of Bradley and likewise of
Plotinus, as partly justifying scepticism since we recognize the
inadequacy of every synthesis except the last. Scepticism ac-
cording to this system is not used to destroy absolutism, but to
establish it. The author clearly reveals his own position in
favoring such abstractions as portrayed by Plotinus and Bradley.
This conception of the Absolute as beyond all relations, beyond
thought, beyond being is an inherent defect that cannot be over-
come and surely prophesies shipwreck for his hopes that Neoplatonis
will prove to be an adequate philosophy for our times.
1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol. I. p. 113.
2. Ho'ffding. Modern Philosophers Quoted.
Philos. of Plotinus Vol. I. p. 114.
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THE WORLD OF SENSE.
He shows that Plotinus is influenced by the triadic
schematism common to the Greeks. The number-mysticism of the
Pythagoreans influenced all Greek speculation. For Plotinus
there were two fundamental triads; first, the Trinity of Divine
Principles — the Absolute, Spirit, and Soul; second, the tri-
partite division of man into Spirit, Soul, and Body. He realizes,
however, that Plotinus is not dominated "by the triad as is the
thought of Proclus and Hegel. The author explains again and again,
that the world of sense for Plotinus, is not the world described
by natural science. He holds that the key to an understanding of
his philosophy is that Neoplatonism deals with spiritual, non-
quantitive relations, and that the Platonic doctrine of "partici-
pation 1 is an attempt to express symbolically the interpenetraticn
of all spiritual existences in an ordered hierarchy'. 1. For
Plotinus, Body, Soul and Spirit, in their objective aspect, are
understood as standing in an ordered hierarchy. Body corresponds
tc the world as seen by the senses; Soul to the world as inter-
preted by mind as a spatial and temporal order; Spirit to the
spiritual world. These three aspects of tne world are perceived
respectively, by the bodily senses, discursive thought, and
spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge. Plotinus considers
this latter faculty as tne highest faculty of our nature. Only ss
we exercise this power do we see the world as it really is, and
only as we exercise this power, ' a oower which all possess but
few use 1 are we real and in contact with reality. "This reality,"
1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.1, p. 123.
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the author says, "is neither an independently existing external
universe, nor a subjective construction thrown off by the mind.
It is constituted by the unity in duality of the spiritual facul-
ty and the spiritual world which it 'beholds' in exercising its
consciousness. Spirit and spiritual world imply and involve each
other; neither has any existence apart from its correlative. If
we call the spiritual world the self-externalization of Spirit, we
must add that with equal propriety Spirit may be called the self-
consciousness of the spiritual world. 1. This exposition of Ploti-
nus ' position is directly in accordance with his conception of an
ordered hierarchy in his thought of reality. This leads logically
to his position that the spiritual world alone possesses reality
while the phenomenal world is only an appearance. This thought
developed by Plotinus is one of his greatest contributions. His
a
theory leads to the conception ofAwo rid of phenomena as over
against a world of reality. While Plotinus leads the way to a
better conception of the material world, his own theory of an or-
dered hierarchy leading finally to matter which he considers as
not possessing reality, is not altogether satisfactory. His con-
ception of an ordered hierarchy resolves itself finally into a
system that does leave us with an abstraction, the Absolute, on
the one hand, and with another abstraction, Matter, on the other.
According to Plotinus' exposition, the Absolute is beyond being,
beyond existence, and Matter is 'not being' outside of being,
thus possessing many of the very qualities of the Absolute.
This position of Plotinus does help us to a more thorough view of
the phenomenali ty of matter but nevertheless, there is an insupeia-
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I, p. 124.
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ble difficulty in his theory of the Absolute as over against
this theory of matter. This tendency to become a prey to mere
abstractions runs through Plotinus • whole system. In his view
the lower grade of being becomes Matter of the one that imme-
diately precedes it, this grade in turn becomes Matter to the
one immediately preceding it until we reach the Absolute; this
Absolute transcends being, thought, existence. In his exposition
of this point the author says, "Every grade of being performs its
highest act in becoming the Matter of the grade above it. Thus
the ail-but non-existent Matter at the bottom of the scale is re-
deemed in giving itself as the recipient of Form. In so doing,
it is an image of the great self-surrender whereby the World-Soul
receives illumination from Spirit, and of the ineffable s elf-sur-
render by which Spirit itself awaits the visitation of the Abso-
lute Godhead." 1. It may readily be seen from this statement
that each grade of being is supposed to be passively receiving
what is given by the grade of being above it. It specifically
surrenders all activity, swooning in succession into the grade
above until the final grade swoons into the Absolute. It is
just here that the author argues against the Personalistic p osi-
tion. In accordance with Plotinus' theory he holds that self-
consciousness and self-control must be surrendered. This is
clearly indicated in his discussion of the modern conception of
personality, which he blames Kant for introducing. He holds that
the goal in Neoplatonism is the unification of the personality and
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.1, p. 143.
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that the clinging taint of selfishness and self-consciousness is
the obstacle to its achievement. 1 . He plays upon the words sel-
fishness and self-consciousness as though they were one and the
same. He holds that the artist does his best work only when he
is rid of self-consciousness. This, it may readily be seen, is
merely playing with terras. The artist does lose self-consciousness
of the type seen in the overgrown sixteen-year-old boy. But this
is not what Personalism means by self-consciousness. The type of
self-consciousness emphasized by Personalism is that which enables
the artist, after losing himself in his work, to know and realize
fully that the work is his own. The complete loss of self-con-
sciousness that he seems to be imagining would not result in
achieving a masterpiece, nor would the artist recognize his work
if he did. It seems strange that the author repudiates the
criticism of Zeller and Schwegler who hold that Plotinus finally
swoons into the Absolute, yet he argues for just that type of ex-
pe ri ence
.
CREATION OF MATTER.
The author holds that Plotinus' view has its foundation in
Plato in the Timaeus, 29, 30 to the effect that God brought order
out of disorder by 'putting Spirit in Soul and Soul in Body'. This
leads to his conclusion that the universe is a living creature en-
dowed with Soul and Spirit by the providence of God. Plato's
view is open to the criticism that God's intervention in reducing
irregular and disorderly motion to harmony, mus t be a motion of
something. He notes that Eckhart faced the same difficulty in
1. Inge. Personal Idealism and Mysticism, p. 103.
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holding that there was no Matter before creation but only 1 inde-
termination
'
, chaos not being created by God. This led to the
hypothesis that some other creative agent accounted for chaos.
Plotinus repudiates this dualism. In Bnnead 1.3.14 he makes the
statement that Soul could not have 1 come 1 , if Matter had not been
there already. The author says that the charge by Chaignet that
Plotinus contradicts himself here is true only if his statement
about Time is taken literally. He says that neither here nor in
the statement in Ennead 3.4.3. 'efficient cause must precede Mat-
ter', is his statement about time to be taken literally. 1. It is
his belief that Plotinus follows Plato in holding the world to be
eternal and that he failed to clarify Plato's obscurity here owing
to his reverence for his mater. He sees that there are difficul-
ties in the doctrine of an eternal creation especially in the
light of Plotinus' theory that the higher principle is before the
lower. The difficulty he recognizes is that the higher principle
cannot begin to mold the lower unless it finds some thing to work
upon. 2. It does not seem to me that the author is able to ex-
plain away the obscurity here. It is on this basis that Harnack
charges Plotinus with metaphysical dualism.
Schwegler explains Plotinus' conception of matter on the
basis of his theory of emanation which assumes that the remoter
emanation possesses even a lower degree of perfection than that
which precedes it; and represents consequently the totality of
existence as a descending series. Thus we finally reach matter,
the indefinite, non-being which is the last and lowest of emana-
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 145.
2. » " I. p. 145.
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tions. 1. Rogers likewise emphasizes this conception of Matter
as mere not-being, a negative limit to reality. He criticizes
Neoplatonism in its attempt to solve the problem of the relation
of the world to God by its theory of a graduated scale of exis-
tence whereby the gap is bridged over by a series of smaller dif-
ferences. This he says that Neoplatonism considers the material
world as lowest of all, 'an image, the shadow of a shadow, where
the negative element, not being, reaches its maximum. • Of this
theory he says, "If all distinctions are essentially unreal, and
the sole reality is the One, unknowable and unapproachable, cloaked
in ineffable nothingness, do we not seem by one stroke to have
blotted out the whole universe of our experience as less than
even a dream?" He concludes that there is a dualism here that
Naoplatonism cannot reconcile with its conception of the One. 2.
It is clear that these discussions bring out the point that
matter presented a problem for Plotinus that he had difficulty
in solving. This problem was no less troublesome for Plato, a
fact which the author reco mizes when he seeks to account for the
unsatisfactory element in the conception of the Platonists as due
to their reverence for Plato. 3- It seems that Dean Inge is near
the truth when he says of the Neoplatonic theory of Matter, "Soul-
less matter which exists as a logical abstraction, is arrived at
by looking at things 'in disconnection, dull and spiritless'. It
is the sphere of the 'merely many', and is zero, as the One who is
not is Infinity." 4. It is only fair to the author to point out
again that he has repudiated his earlier statements on Neoplatonis m. 5.
1. Schwegler. Hist, of Philosophy, p. 141.
2. Rogers. Student's Hist. of Philos. p. 178-180.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 149
4. Inge. Christian Mysticism, p. 95.
5. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I.p.l. Note.
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However the fact remains that the One at the one extreme and Mat-
ter at the other in Plotinus 1 theory appear to be abstractions.
His theory of a graduated hierarchy from the One to Matter does
not help him solve the problem for as Rogers points out the 'not
being' however attenuated as over against the One is still a stub-
born fact. 1.
The author gives a survey of the traditional Christian
doctrine, creation out of nothing. He says that this does not
mean that God took some nothing and made a world. Augustine's
position is that God made the world because he wished to make it.
"When we say He made it out of nothing, we mean that there was no
preexistent Matter, unmade by Himself, without which He could not
have made the world." 2. He held that the world was created not
in Time, but with Time.
Aquinas' held that 'creation is a production of a thing ac-
cording to its whole substance, nothing being presupposed, whether
created or uncreated. Origen taught that the world did not begin
in time and held to a series of worlds succeeding each other with-
out beginning or end. Scotus Brigena, as the author notes, comes
nearest to the view of Plotinus. He makes creation co-eternal with
God, who is prior to the world only as its cause. ' When w e hear
it said that God makes all things, we ought to understand simply
that God is in all things; that is, that He subsists as the Being
of all things. 3. He points out that Hegel's idea that it belongs
to the essence of God to create is not Plotinus' view, in that
Hegel's view in a sense subordinates God to the category of Time.
1. Rogers. Student's Hist. of Philosophy p. 179
2. Augustine. Ad Orosium 1-2. Quoted Philos.of
Plotinus. Vol I. p. 145.
3. Scotus Brigena Quoted Philos.of Plotinus.
Vol. I. p. 146.
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The value in Plotinus' view, the author thinks, is that he
gives us a refutation of materialism. I think that this is true.
He does lead toward the conclusion that Matter is phenomenal.
However, the fact remains that he never could quite solve the dif-
ficulty in that he conceived Matter as evil. Dean Inge charges
tnat Platonic schools were not thoroughly honest in dealing with
this problem. He holds that some Platonists and Pythagoreans
•taught as a popular doctrine, a metaphysical dualism which they
did not themselves "believe. 1 It is his opinion that this doctrine
was retained in popular lecturing, as he says, "not so much from
want of candor, but from reverence for Plato, who in some of his
most eloquent passages had described the heavy weight which lies
upon the Soul while it is enclosed in this muddy vesture of decay."
1. He explains the dualism in Philo and Plutarch as due to the
fact that they associated evil with Matter, not because it is
corporeal but because it is in a state of flux and change. This,
he holds, is the key to much that is hard to understand in Pla-
tonism. He says, "For a Greek, the nature of God means, specifi-
cally, immortality. The gods are deathless and changeless; the
greatest of evils in this world is that all things change, decay
and die... The body is a dead weight, not because it is material,
but because it is perishable. 2. He believes that these writers
saw clearer than Plotinus that the soul can fight its battles
only on its own ground. They saw that the enemies of the soul
must be psychic which Plotinus did not. 3.
1.
2.
3.
Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 149.
« « " " I. p. 149
" " « " I. p. 150.
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SPACE AND TIME.
The author quotes at length from Professor Taylor's "Elements
of Metaphysics" to prove that neither space nor time can "be more
than an appearance of reality. He makes a distinction "between
what he calls perceptual and conceptual space. Both perceptual
space and time are what they are because seen from the standpoint
of our finitude. Conceptual space and time he holds, are constructed
by deliberate abstraction from the relation to immediate experience
implied in individuality. Since neither perceptual space and time,
nor conceptual space and time gives a point of view, both individual
and infinite, neither can be the point of view of an infinite ex-
perience." An absolute experience must be out of time and out of
space, in the sense that its contents are not apprehended in the
form of the spatial and temporal series, but is some other way.
Space and time then must be the phenomenal appearance of a higher
reality which is spaceless and timeless." 1.
Dean Inge is inclined to believe that the distinction between
perceptual and conceptual space is somewhat overemphasized by this
argument but he concludes that the result of this maturer analysis
is the same as is found in the Enneads. Here space is only ap-
pearance but it is the appearance of the reality that is yonder.
He says that the belief that 'the invisible things of God are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made 1 is
fundamental for Platonism. "Space is after everything else", the
lowest rung of the ladder. It is inferior to Time; for while Space
furnishes the stage and scenery of the world-drama, Time gives us
the play itself." 2.
1. Taylor. Elements of Metaphysics quoted inPhilos.
.of Plotinus. Vol.1, p. 165.
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.1, p. 168.
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The author explains that Plotinus was aware of the diffi-
culties in the problem of Time. His plan was to try to under-
stand it from a study of the "blessed ancients". The real
problem in Time is evident when we seek to analyze it. He quotes
Augustine who says "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know
if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not." 1.
Plato's definition of time 'as the moving image of eternity'
which it resembles as much as it can, is given with the inter-
pretation of some of the Pythagoreans who identify Eternity with
the spiritual world and Time with the phenomenal world. This he
holds must not be done, for the spiritual world contains particu-
lar things as parts of itself, while Eternity contains them as an
unified whole -- it contains them as they are sub specie
aeterni tat is . 2.
He shows that Plotinus examines the view of the Stoics
who identify Time with motion and that this view is rejected on
the grounds that if Time and motion were the same there would be
many times. The theory of Time attributed to Erathosthenes and
Hestiaeus of Perinthus, that Time is 'that which is moved' is re-
jected. The view of Zeno that Time is 'the interval of motion'
is rejected for the reason that intervals are not uniform. This
would result as before in many times, besides interval is not a
temporal expression. Aristotle's view of Time as 'the number
and measure of motion is rejected because of the difficulty of
the irregularity of motion which would necessitate many times.
1. Augustine Confessions Quoted Bk.XI.14.
. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 169. Note.
2. " » " Vol. I. p. 169.
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The author quotes Plotinus to the effect that what the
Aristotelians ought to have said, and probably meant, was that
Time is measured by motion . The Epicurean theory that time is
an accident or consequence of motion is rejected as no explana-
tion at all . 1
.
The constructive part of Plotinus ' teaching with regard to
Time.
For Plotinus, Time is one of the given facts of experience.
As to its origin, Dean Inge says tnat he half banteringly suggests
a mythological explanation. His view is that 'Time, still non-
existent, reposed in the bosom of Reality, until Nature, wishing
to become its own mistress and to enter into possession of itself,
and to enlarge the sphere of its activities, put itself and Time
together with itself, into motion' "Thus", says the author, "Time
the image of Eternity, arose through the desire of the Soul of the
World to exert its active powers." Time is the form which the
Soul creates for itself when it desires to reproduce the eternal
ideas as living and creative activities. It is the life of the
Soul as it moves from one manifestation of life to another.' ...
Time is the activity of an eternal Soul, not turned towards it-
self nor within itself, but exercised in creation and generation." 2.
The author recognizes that Plotinus' view of Time anticipates
some of the best modern thought. He notes that Plotinus' view
has points of similarity with Bergson's doctrine of la dure'e. He
criticizes Bergson, however, on the ground that his view is one
sided, in that he regards the past as flowing into the present and
modifying it, while he does not regard the future as affecting the
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I .p. 169
.
2. » w Vol. I. p. 175-173.
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present. "The future appears to be non-existent for Bergson,
though the past exists." 1. He likewise criticizes Bergson in
his conception of Space as over against Time. He shows that Berg-
son differs from Plotinus in making space prior to the objects
which it contains. This view of space he calls "a very vulnerable
spot in his philosophy ."' 2.
For Plotinus Time is the form of willed change .' Every dis-
tinct idea yonder becomes a finite puroose here. Every attri-
bute of God's essence becomes an activity of His existence. The
time-process is not the necessary form of the self-evolution of
God; it is the product of His free but necessary creative activi-
ty." 3. He holds that for Plotinus Time is a teleological cate-
gory. "It is the measure of a definite finite activity directed
to some end beyond itself." 4.
It will be seen that this exposition of Plotinus 1 view of
time reveals that Plotinus is clos ely a Hied with Plato, his
master, who regarded time as 'the moving image of eternity J'
Augustine likewise held that 'God made the world not in time but
with time'. Time for Plotinus is likewise closely related to
creation. According to Dean Inge's exposition, 'Time is the ac-
tivity of an eternal soul, exercised in creation. ' He sees that
in Plotinus' view 'Soul is the creator of the phenomenal world
and the time process, and that this creation is a continuous act,
being the activity which constitutes the out-going life of the Soul
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 175.
2. " " " " I. p. 176.
3. " » " " I. p. 182.
4. » " " I. p. 183.
5. " " " '» I. p. 185.
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He notes that in past and future from the human point of view,
there is a real generic difference. "The will, of which Time is
the form, has a wholly dfferent relation to the future from that
which it has to the past. In looking back, the will confesses its
impotence; in looking forward it finds its scope and raison d'etre.
It is because psychical reality is will, not memory, that we re-
gard the past as 'done with'. Memory indeed proves that our con-
sciousness of a moving present, perpetually passing out of exis-
tence, is an illusion."" 1.
Time for Plotinus is not ontologi cally real. In Spirit the
time relation is transcended. He explains that in Plotinus' con-
ception of the outgoing life of the Soul resulting in the creation
of the phenomenal world and the time-process, the Soul has 'come
down 1 on a temporary adventure. This time-process is thus trans-
cended when the Soul returns by contemplation of Spirit. "The
Soul must take its Time- experience up with it to the threshold
of Eternity; it will leave nothing behind as it crosses the
threshold." 2.
The criticism that must be directed to this exposition is
that which applies to Neoplatonism in general. The hierarchical
conception of reality is shot through with abstractions. The time-
process is transcended only by a process of contemplation which
ends, in this upward climb from the world of sense, in the usual
Neoplatonic abstraction. The Personalis ti c position with regard
to the complete ideality of space and time seems to me to be
worked out along much sounder lines. The conception of Reality as
1. Philos. of Plotinus, Vol. I. p. 135.
2. " " " " I. p. 186.
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personal is the foundation that gives one a vantage point in
considering such difficult problems as change and identity, time
and eternity. What Personalism explains on the basis of a more com
plete. understanding of Personality, Neoplatonism seeks to ar-
rive at on the basis of contemplation and abstraction.
THE SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY.
The author traces the various conceptions of the soul as
held by thinkers preceding Plotinus. He explains that the early
idea of the soul probably had its source in animism. Empedocles
holds the Soul to be compounded of all elements each of which has
a soul. Plato constructs Soul out of the elements. Deraocritus
identifies Soul and Mind. Anaxagoras identifies Soul and Mind,
making Mind the principle of all things. Heracleitus identifies
Soul with the 'fiery process' source of other existing things,
least corporeal and in constant movement. The Orphics taught
that the Soul is fallen, a wanderer until the end of the cosmic
year. The significant thing in their doctrine is that the Soul
retains its individuality through all transmigrations. The
Pythagoreans held to the doctrine of a multitude of immortal
souls thus breaking up the older idea that 'Soul 1 generically is
the active power or manifestation of one spiritual being. The
author explains that Aristotle recognized two theories of the
Soul in early philosophy. Those who centered on the animate as
that which moves, regard soul as that which is most capable of
movement; and those who center on the fact that the Soul knows
and perceives, identify Soul with the elementary Drinciples of
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all existence. 1.
He conceives Plotinus 1 position to be that of one who is at-
tempting a syncretism of two different views. One that identifies
Soul with Mind or Spirit and the other that thought of many Souls.
One of the most significant points is that Plotinus held that the
Soul stands midway "between the phenomenal world and the world of
Spirit. Thus he believes in the immateriality of the Soul. Soul
he regards as the offspring of Spirit, the energy thrown off by
Spirit, an image of Spirit. "Sou}, is still a part of the Divine
world, though the lowest part. ' It is not Matter and Form, but
Form only, and power and energy s econd to that of Spirit. Soul
is eternal and timeless. It may be compared to a moving circle
round the One, while Spirit is an unmoving circle. Soul is 'indi-
visible even when it is divided; for i t is all in all and all in
every part.... Soul is distinguished from Spirit by the presence
of unfulfilled desire in Soul, Spirit being free from all desires.
Soul as an activity proceeding from Spirit, is in labor to create
after the pattern which it saw in Spirit, and from this desire
'the whole world that we know arose and took its shapes J " 2.
Dr. Khudson sees in Plotinus' work many statements which an-
ticipate the modern personalistic conception of the self. This
is one of Plotinus' great contributions. Personalism makes this
conception of the self central, as the key to ultimate reality.
Plotinus did not develop the metaphysical significance of the
Soul*s synthesis of unity and plurality, although he did give to
the Soul a certain pre-eminence. His doctrine of emanation, in
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 201.
2 . " " " I. p. 204.
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which he conceives of each succeeding grade of reality as
emanating from the grade immediately proceding, necessarily in-
volved him in difficulties that all his power to paint pictures
could not overcome. In his conception of reality which he finds
in the One he becomes a prey to abstractions throughout his en-
tire system. "Unity, intelligence, and the soul -- the Neopla-
tonic trinity — are not distinct or independent realities, as
Plotinus held. They are simply abstractions from the unitary
and conscious life of the self. And the self, too, is not a
compound of consciousness and life. Its life, as a matter of
fact, is its consciousness, and its consciousness is its life;
and only in its living consciousness do we have true reality. "1.
This failure of the advocates of Neoplatonism to understand that
abstract conceptions of reality cannot satisfy the demands of
reason is the surest proof that their hopes that Neoplatonism will
become the prevailing philosophy can never be realized.
In his doctrine of the World- Soul the author brings out the
thought that Plotinus held that the world is in the World-Soul
rather than that the World-Soul is in the world. This World-Soul,
the third Person in the Neoplatonic Trinity, he holds is very near
to Spirit. The World-Soul is creator and providence of the world.
He notes that Plotinus differs from Plato here in that he goes
beyond Plato who allowed souls to animals, in allowing souls to
vegetables and minerals. He says that Plotinus is in agreement
with Leibnitz and Fechner in allowing that the heavenly bodies
have life or sou}. He upholds Plotinus' thought that there are
many things in the universe more Divine than man. He prefers
1. Dr.Knudsongo^tey.QSj^vEO^iTyersonalisra.p.243.
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Plotinus 1 view here to what he considers the absurd doctrines o
f
Hegel and Wallace. He accuses Hegel of making this earth the
center of the Universe, and Germany the hub of the planet. 1.
In his doctrine of individual souls, the author develops
the idea that Plotinus argues against such monists as Heracleitus,
the Stoics and some Neopythagoreans . He holds that individual
souls are 'Logoi of Spirits, corresponding to distinct Spirits
yonder. 1 He shows, however, that Plotinus regards the division
of souls from each other as the affection of bodies. While the
body makes these divisions he nevertheless holds that in the
spiritual world they are one. "All souls are one. The Soul is
the sphere of the One- and Many as the Spirit is the sphere of the
One-Many. That is to say, individuality is a fact, but sympathy
is also a fact, which bears witness to a real unity behind the ap-
parent separateness . 2. This is the quality of the soul that Per-
sonalises seizes upon as the center of its system. This fact of
the soul's synthesis of unity and plurality which is given in ex-
perience is made basic as the key to ultimate reality. Neopla-
tonism however, emphasizes pure unity in the One as the highest
reality and seeks to transcend this Many-and One relationship
as having no place in this transcendent Unity. Herein again is
the characteristic weakness of Plotinus 1 system, that he prefers
a unity that is an abstraction rather than a unity in diversity
on the basis of free personality.
Schwegler in his History of Philosophy attacks the system
of Plotinus on the basis that the ultimate end of individual s ouls
is unconscious absorption--disappearance— in God. He argues that
1. Philos.of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 211.
2. « « w I. p. 214.
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in finding the highest principle, not through self-consciousness
and natural rational explanation, but only through ecstasy, mystic
annihilation of self, it is the overleaping of all philosophy, and
the destruction of ancient philosophy. He maintains that this
mystic absorption into the One, this trance or swooning into the
absolute, is a characteristic of Neoplatonism that is opposed to
the Greek philosophical systems proper. 1. Dean Inge attempts to
answer this question as to the absorption of the soul or self in
the absolute. He notes the difficulties in the question which he
believes involves the question of personality, human and divine.
He states Lotze's conclusion that we have little ground to speak
of finite personality, and that personality is an ideal proper
only to the infinite in unconditioned nature. 2. Another view is
that personality is the name for our delimitation of individual
existence. He quotes Wallace to the effect that personality exists
only because we are not pure spirits. His conclusion is that per-
sonality is a limitation because it involves relations to others
and hence cannot be applied to Deity. 3. Self consciousness and
self-direction regarded by Personalism a s distinguishing marks of
personality, Neoplatonism treats very unsatisfactorily. Self-con-
sciousness is not regarded as an ultimate state of the human spirit.
4. The Dean of St. Paul's argues that our best work is done when
we leave self-consciousness behind. 5. This is but juggling wi th
the terms for the fact that we still remember that it is 'our work'
is proof enough that self-consciousness in the personalisti c sense,
has not been left behind.
1. Schwegler. Hist. Phi los. p. 140, 143.
2. Philos.of Plotinus.Vol.I.p.249-50
3. » " I. p. 250
4. " » « » I. p. 238.
5. " " » " I. p. 238.
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That Neoplatonism refuses to ascribe primary importance
to human consciousness, he regards as one of the strong points in its
favor for thereby it is in sympathy with mysticism. It seems that
this position makes Schwegler's criticism of Neoplatonism diffi-
cult to gainsay. If we reach reality only through a mystic swoon
into the absolute it is difficult to reach any other conclusion
than the one Schwegler comes to with regard to Neoplatonism over-
leaping all philosophy. 1. In this same connection it is the con-
clusion of Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy that
the Alexandrians exaggerated the tendency of the Cynics and Stoics
to despise humanity. He accounts for Plotinus being ashamed of
his body on the basis of his contempt for human personality. He
develops the idea that Plotinus seized upon ecstasy as the faculty
by which the mind divests itself of its personality. In ecstasy
the soul is separated from body, is separated from individual con-
sciousness and finally becomes absorbed in the Infinite Intelligence
from which it emanated. He accounts for Plotinus 1 enthusiasm for
ecstasy on the basis of his desire to get rid of personality. On
the basis of the identify of subject and object, of thought and
thing, without which he holds Neoplatonism is a blank, personality
is absorbed. "As soon as I comprehend the Infinite, I am Infinite
myself; that is to say, I am no longer myself, no longer that
finite being having a consciousness of his ora separate existence.
If therefore, I attain to a knowledge of the Infinite, it is not
by my Reason, which is finite and embraces finite objects only,
but by some higher faculty, a faculty altogether impersonal, which
identifies itself with its object." 2.
1. Schwegler. Hist. of Philos. p. 143.
2. Plotinus Enn.5.5.10. Lewes Biographical Hist. of
Philosophy Vol.1 .p. 314-316.
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The author lists the following faculties of the soul in
Plotinus' system; sensation, memory, imagination, opinion, and
reason. Reason he regards as the proper activity of the Soul
in which it discharges its chief function. 1.
In the discussion of the descent of the Soul, he emphasizes
the point that Plotinus is perplexed. The views not all of which
are consistent are that souls were created and sent into the world
that they might he molded a little nearer to the Divine image by
yearning for the home which they have left. Thus the soul des-
cends not of its own choice. Plotinus turns to Plato who regards
the soul as moulting its wing feathers on coming in contact with
matter. 2. Plotinus does not wholly agree with Plato in dispar-
aging the world, holding that we may care for the lower without
ceasing to abide in the highest and best. 3. It seems to be the
center of Plotinus' view that the Universal Soul and individual
souls are necessarily sent here as representations of the world
of Spirit. His frequent use of the saying 'There is nothing Yon-
der that is not also Here' is typical of his viewpoint. Yet,
Plotinus held that the soul is guilty on two counts, one in coming
down and the other in entering into bodies. He also develops the
idea that the soul gains a ^knowledge of good and evil in coming
down, and is not hurt provided it returns quickly. Porphry fur-
ther develops this idea that this knowledge of evil is gained for
the purpose of being liberated from any desire for it. Plotinus,
however, seems to sense the danger that the soul should become so
enamoured with sensuous things that it should forget its source.
The emphasis here is that the soul is a spiritual being and must
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p. 221.
2. " " " I. p. 256.
3. " » I. p. 259.
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not forget its connection with the spiritual world. 1.
To the question, Does the soul all descend? Plotinus gives
a negative answer. He holds that there is a nucleus that does
not consent to evil. In this he is not followed by his successors.
Iambi ichus held that there is no pure soul that remains sinless
while the 'composite nature 1 goes astray. "For 'if the will sins
how can the soul be sinless'." 2. Proclus holds that the soul
descends because it wishes to imitate the providence of the gods.
Thus the author concludes there is no contamination so long as the
soul remembers that it has been sent as God's fellow-worker. As
to Plotinus' view that the soul does not all descend, Dean Inge
makes the interesting observation that there are many persons of
whom we may say that the soul does not seem to have 'come down'
entire. On the basis of this problem which proved perplexing to
Plotinus, we may say that the perplexity remains. There seems to
be a certain prodigality on the part of the Infinite with regard
to both the physical world and the world of human life that must
forever prove baffling. We may be able to account for the exis-
tence of a few choice souls but when we consider much in our own
lives and the lives of the great masses of men who have been, are
now, or ever shall be, we join in hoping with Dean Inge that in
another life the soul may be able to act more freely.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.1 .p. 252, 854, 257.
2. " » " Vol. I. p. 262.
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IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
Plotinus 1 idee as to immortality of the soul as developed
by Dean Inge is one of the least rewarding parts of his exposi-
tion. He surveys the development of the idea of immortality and
finds, as do Salraond and Pringle-Pattison, that among the Greeks
the doctrine belonged to Orphic tradition. The prevailing idea
among the Greeks was that only the gods enjoyed the prerogative
of deathlessness. 1. He traces the various ideas and arguments
advanced by Plato and comes to the general conclusion that his
writings reveal no fixed and definite conviction. 2. This gener-
al conclusion is shared by Galloway in his book, "The Idea of
Immortality" and by Pringle-Pattison in his book with the same
title. The principal ideas developed by Plato as treated by Deen
Inge are as follows: In the Phaedo the argument is based on the
belief that the theory of Ideas e nd the doctrine of immortality,
stand or fall together. In the Apology no one knows but he hopes
the good man will find more congenial company. In the Meno, immor-
tality is a beautiful tale of priests end poets, but says also that
if the truth of real being is in the soul it must be immortal.
In the Phaedo he uses the doctrine of reminiscence to establish
pre-existence, inferring that souls remain unchanged through s uc-
cessive in carnations. Next he uses the argument that the soul
is the idea of life and is alien to death. He points out that
this is the familiar fallacy of the old ontological proof. Pringle-
Pattison adds that in the Phaedo Plato bases his argument for im-
mortality on the theory that everything which has an opposite is
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 3.
2. H " » » II. p. 10
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generated. only from that opposite. Hence, as life and death
are opposites they are generated one from the other. This argu-
ment is based upon the idea of a limited supply of souls. As to
the cogency of the argument Pringle-Pattison says that it would
be possible to prove on the same principles a perpetual alterna-
tion between drunk and sober. 1. In the Republic and the Phaedrus
he argues that the soul has indestructible life in its own right.
There is another argument that Plato uses in the Republic which
both Galloway and Pringle-Pattison mention and that is that of
justice or that immortality rests upon the thought of the goodness
of God. The following oassage from the Republic seems clear: "Then
this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in
poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things
will in the end work together for good to him in life and death:
for the Gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just
and to be like God, as far as a man can attain his likeness, by
the pursuit of virtue?
"Yes, he said; "if he is like God he will surely not be
neglected by him." 2.
While this belief of Plato is grounded in his theology it
seems very doubtful if we shall find a surer foundation even for air
own belief than in the goodness of God.
Another argument advanced in the Timaeus is that the higher
part of Souls is the direct work of the Divine intelligence. God
cannot wish to destroy His own work and nothing else can destroy it.
Souls are immortal because made in the image of God. The author
1* Pringle-Pattison. Idea of Immortality, p. 44.
2. Republic 613. Jowett's translation Vol. 2. p. 444.
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concludes that on the basis of this argument there is doubt as
to how much of what we consider our souls is really immortal. 1.
Aristotle's position is that the higher soul or impersonal
Nous is immortal but that the hopes for the individual are very
doubtful. Soul, for Aristotle, Pringle-Pattison holds, is func-
tioning of the body. This is true throughout the lower ranges of
the soul-experience, but Nous, the higher intelligence, being in
its essential nature an activity 'would seem to be developed in us
as a self-existent substance and to be imperishable'. This con-
ception of Nous, Pringle-Pattison points out, led Aristotle to the
conclusion that individual immortality is impossible. 2. Both
Inge and Pringle-Pattison conclude that Aristotle's conception of
Soul would seem to preclude the possibility of individual immor-
tality. 3.
The Stoics held that the destiny of the Soul is to be reab-
sorbed into the primal essence. This is based upon their doctrine
that nothing ever really oerishes, hence the soul is immortal.
The Epicureans denied immortality altogether. 4. It seems that
this Stoic doctrine is one that comes very near the Neoplatonic
conception of immortality especially in the light of his mystical
conception of absorption into the Absolute. He speaks of the
mystical experience as being absorbed in God. "Absorbed in God
he makes but one with Him, like a center of a circle coinciding
with another center." 5.
The following points are at the center of Plotinus » teaching
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 8-10.
2. Pringle-Pattison. Idea of Immortality, p. 68.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 11.
4. " " " II. p. 12.
5. Plotinus quoted by Tennant. Philosophical
Theology. p. 321.
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up on the subject of immortality: He advances the idea that the
soul exists in its own right, neither coming into existence nor
perishing. The soul is one and simple activity in living. He
advances the idea that plants and animals have an immortal princi-
ple in them because they are sharers in Soul. Bodies have not
true being, therefore resurrection is from the body rather than
with the body. The author realizes the difficulty in trying to
answer the question as to how far individuality is maintained
Yonder. Yet Plotinus holds that souls are Logoi of Spirits and
each represents a distinct entity in the spiritual world. This
distinctness he regards as never lost, although the distinctions
of Souls are latent in the world of Spirit. He quotes from the
Bnneads 4.3.4. and 3.2.4 to the effect that discarnate Souls are
in a sense absorbed into the Universal Soul and help to govern
the world. 1. From these statements it is clear that the author
is correct in his conclusion that it is difficult to say how far
individuality is maintained Yonder. It is true, however, that he
insists that immortality will be on the impersonal plane. He
quotes Keyserling to the effect that Mysticism ends in an imper-
sonal immortality, and to the effect that the individual is not
ultimate. 3. Yet the author on this same page asserts that 'The
inner meaning and reality of each individual life, remains a dis-
tinct fact in the world of Spirit. On the basis of the abstract
Unity which is seen in the monism of Neoplatonism, this problem
of immortality is bound to be troublesome. It looks as though the
extreme monism of Neoplatonism would mean the complete absorption
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II .p. 20-22
2. w h « Vol. II. p. 23.
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of the soul so that immortality on the impersonal plane almost if
not altogether amounts to annihilation. On the other hand, Per-
sonal ism laying stress upon personality as real seems to awaken a
much stronger presumption in favor of personal immortality. Per-
sonalism stands for the reality of the finite self, and thus holds
to a limited pluralism as over and against the monism of absolute
idealism. However, it insists on a basal unity personally con-
ceived. Thus finding in personality the key to reality, and in-
sisting that the problems of unity and identity, plurality and
change may be understood only as we rise to the personal plane,
personalism awakens stronger presuppositions in favor of immor-
tality than is found in Ueoplatonism which sees in personality a
distinct limitation.
Plotinus ' belief in transmigration of souls is discussed and
the conclusion is reached that he is simply amusing himself in
trying his hand at a Platonic myth. He recognizes that Plotinus
is inconsistent holding at one time thebelief in a purgatory for
disembodied Souls, and again holding the belief that the bad are
reborn as animals or that retribution, in kind, is their lot
upon being reborn as men. Porphyry and Iarablichus, he shows,
opposed the belief of Plotinus that human souls are ever sent to
inhabit bodies of beasts andbirds. 1. Among those who support
the doctrine of transmigration in modern times, he cites the fol-
lowing: Krause, Swedenborg, Lavater, Ibsen, Maeterlinck, McTaggart,
Hume, Goethe, and Lessing. He concludes that perhaps Plotinus and
Hegel would agree that the question is meaningless. 2.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.11, p. 33,34.
2. « " " II. p. 34.
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In s umraing up his exposition of the Personalis tic position
on the question of immortality, Dr. Khudson says, "No d emons tra-
tion of the future life is possible. An extreme personalis tic
pluralism here deceives itself; and so also does that form of abso-
lute idealism which seeks logically to deduce the future life from
the being and character of God. Kant was right in basing the be-
lief in immortality chiefly on the moral nature; but so was Plato
in teaching that a theoretical as well as a practical basis for the
belief is to be found in the nature of the soul and in the nature
of God." 1. Plotinus, it will be seen does ground his belief upon
the nature of the soul as real. He is not hindered in his conceptbn
by the question of the relation of the soul to the body, since he gave
soul the place of preeminence. However, there remains the diffi-
culty that the soul returning by contemplation to the One, has an
ecstatic vision of the One and thereby loses all self-consciousness.
This vision of the One must be removed which process looks very much
like 'swooning' into the Absolute, nirvana, complete absorption
into the One.
THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.
The author comments upon the fact that he met with difficulty
in finding equivalents for the terms used by Plotinus. He conr
eludes that the nearnest we can come to the trinity in unity in
which reality consists, is to use the terms - Spirit, Spiritual
Perception, and the Spiritual World. Thus he argues that reality
for Plotinus corresponds to reality as opposed to appearance in
Bradley's philosophy, and that reality is neither thought nor
thing but their indissoluble union. He holds that in thought and
1. Philos. of Personalism. p. 327. Dr. Khudson.
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thing there is a reciprocal relationship in which each implies
the other. This reciprocal relationship, he points out, in his
conception of Spirit and Spiritual World. These two, he holds,
involve each other end cannot be separated. 1.
The following statements culled from the Enneads emphasize
this position of Plotinus: "The Spiritual World cannot be outside
Spirit. 'Spirit, the whole of reality, and truth are one nature. '
Yet the relation is not bare identity. 'The perceiving Spirit must
be one, and two, simple and not simple. • 'Spirit by its power of
perception, posits Being and Being by being perceived, gives to
Spirit perception and existence.' 'The cause, both of spiritual
perception and of Being is another' i.e. their common principle,
the One. Thus the conclusion is reached that the two sides of
reality are of equal rank, and not one derived from the other."
Spirit in beholding reality, beheld itself, and in beholding en-
tered into its proper activity, and this activity is itself. 1
'Spirit knows that its own principle (the One) is above itself,
and that that which comes next after the One is itself; and none
else can bring it any surer knowledge than this about itself —
it knows that it exists in very truth, in the spiritual world.
Absolute truth, therefore, agrees not with any other but with
itself; it says nothing outside itself; it is, and what it is it
says.' 'To know is the same as to be. 1 'The Spirit that neither
divides now is divided is not Dart of us; we oass into it only
when we awake out of ourselves and find ourselves in the presence
of the One which is beyond existence. 1 Thus the author argues that
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 38.
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Spirit when absolutely undivided and undividing is indistin-
guishable from the Absolute. • If Spi rit- in- itself were the
creator, the created would have to be inferior to Soirit, but clos
to Spirit and like Spirit; but since the creator (the Absolute) is
beyond Spirit, the created must be Spirit. But why is the creator
not Spirit? Because spiritual perception is the activity of Spirit
From these quotations he concludes that Plotinus was no slave to
technical terms, since he realized that sharp distinctions belong
to the logical faculty, not to y.^P.S' and that these methods are
inappropriate when considering the stage above the discursive in-
tellect. Indeed it is on this basis of the fluid state of Soirit
and Spiritual World, since they flow over into each other, that
we have the Neoplatonic reconciliation of the One and the Many,
of Sameness and Otherness. He comes to the conclusion that
reality for Neoplatonism is eternal life; it is a never-failing
spiritual activity; it is the continual self-expression of a God
who 'speaks and it is done, who commands and it stands f ast. ' 1.
Personalist will have no quarrel with the aim of this exposi-
tion which is to account for the fact of knowledge and reality
on the basis of an underlying unity which is spiritual. However,
the position of Personalism seems much more secure in finding in
personality itself the key to reality and in this the basis for
the solution or reconciliation of the One and Many, Sameness and
Otherness. The whole question as to the nature of reality as
personal does not involve one in the weird abstractions of the
Neoplatonists . This exposition of Plotinus' viewpoint reveals
1. Bnneads 5 and 6. Philos. of Plotinus.
Vol.II.p-37-49
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that Plotinus is very near the absolute idealism of Bradley.
One of the fundamental conceptions of reality for personalism
is that reality is concrete and individual. For Neoplatonism
reality is anything but concrete and individual. It is super-
eve rything, transcending individuality. Neoplatonism and Per-
sonalism agree in asserting that fundamental reality is One, but
the One of Neoplatonism is a unity that resolves itself into a
bare abstraction. This is seen in its rejection of the personal-
listic position that ultimate reality is personal. Both hold that
matter is phenomenal. Personalism holds the occas ionalis ti c or
panentheis tic theory of matter. Matter is passive and furnishes
only the occasions of mental or psychic activity. Neoplatonism is
indeterminate in its conception of matter, holding that matter is
outside being. The hierarchical conception of reality which is
fundamental in Neoplatonism, reduces matter to a mere abstraction.
Personalism is activistic, holding that activity constitutes the
essential nature of being, while Neoplatonism holds to an abstract,
transcendental unity that cannot be said to be dynamic.
In his exposition of Plotinus' viewpoint the author mentions
three pairs of categories each consisting of opposites which are
reconciled in the spiritual world: Spirit and Being, or Thought
and Thing, Difference and Identity, Stability and Movement or
Permanence and Change. 1. He recognizes that Plotinus is incon-
sistent in that sometimes he omits the first oair and makes four
categories; sometimes he enumerates five, leaving out Yovi.
He explains that Plotinus is following the obscure argument of
Plato's Sophist without introducing clearness.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 53.
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He finds Plotinus in error in treating the category of Being.
Being is distinguished from Reality. He says, 'Being and Reality
are different. Being is found by abstraction from the others (i.e.
the other two pairs of categories); but Reality is Being together
with Movement, Stability, Identity, and Difference.' He concludes
that Being has the same relation to Spirit as Stability and Move-
ment, and that Plotinus is in error in making v'o'os andV'o/j-f-oV
a pair of categories by the side of the other two pairs. "For",
he says, "the antithesis of Stability and Movement, and of Identi-
ty and Difference, belongs to the sphere of discursive reason, the
Soul-World. They only become categories of Spirit when their con-
tradictions are harmonised by being taken up into a higher sphere.
But when they cease to be contradictories, they cease to be them-
selves." 1.
THE SAME AND OTHER.
The author develops Plotinus' view that the main task of
Soul and of Spirit is to systematize and unify. The antithesis
between Identity and Difference, he holds, is most fundamental,
for only as we understand how it can be transcended can we hope
to understand how Change and Permanence, Thought and Object, can
be unified in the world of Spirit. • 2. It is Plotinus' doctrine
that 'otherness and sameness emphasize each other'. Individual
Spirits are not parts of the one Spirit. They exist in each
other. 'The universal is implicit in the particular. ' 'Spirit
itself is not simple any more than Soul. • 'Spirit not only engenders
all things; it is all things.' Thus the author reaches the conclu-
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. P. 60.
2. •' " " II. p. 61.

-67-
sion that plurality belongs to Spirit. 'Spirit is one in many,
and many in One. • This relation he holds is not one of absolute
identity. The antithesis of the Same and the Other is transcended
in Spirit. 1.
MOVEMENT AND STABILITY.
The author emphasizes the fact that Greek philosophy "before
Plotinus, had recognized that Movement and Stability are compli-
mentary ideas. He rightly classes Plato as no prohpet of staticism
by showing that in the Sophist he completely repudiates staticism.
Plotinus follows his master here and holds that Spirit is perfect
activity. He believes that Plotinus would agree with Bradley's
conception of activity as self-caused change in time, but that he
would differ from Bradley in holding that the idea of non- temporal
activity was not meaningless. 2. Plotinus opposes Aristotle's
conception of movement as imperfect activity, because there is
'movement in the world of Spirit.' 'Movement does not need time,
which only measures the quantity of movement. '3. He concludes that
Plotinus holds that movement in the spiritual world is not anti-
thetic to stability, since its activity is not a development of
itself into something that it was not before. So far as the tem-
poral process is concerned, movement is regarded as imperfect and
the activity is regarded as imperfect in comparison with the move-
ment in Spirit which does not need time.
He recognizes that the difficulty here is to prevent the two
aspects of reality, Change and Permanence, from falling apart after
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. o. 63.
2. » " » » 1 1. p. 65
3. Enneads 3.1.13. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 35.
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we have reconciled them. This, he shows, Plotinus does by his
doctrine of ideas. "In the world of Soul the ideas are pola.rized,
not only into a multiplicity of forms, but into a series of suc-
cessive states within the unitary process." 1. His view is that
the ideas are potentially present in the world of soul and by rising
from the soul world, the One and Many, to the world of Spirit, the
One-Many the problem is solved.
The author acknowledges that he is by no means satisfied with
Plotinus* conception of the categories of the spiri tual world. It
is his contention that the discursive reason is inadequate when we
come to comprehend the things of the Spirit. It is his conviction
that we have to do with a kingdom of absolute values in the discus-
sion of which we leave these dialectical problems behind. He would
follow Proclus who recognizes that here we have to do with the king-
dom of absolute values. These values, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty
are attributes of Reality and constitute its essence. He says,
"Things truly are , in proportion as they 'participate' in Goodness,
Truth, and Beauty." 2. He recognizes the difficulty that inheres
in this scheme in that judgments of value give us an essentially
graduated world, and that judgments of existence are not so easily
graduated. He refers to Bradley's contention that graduation belongs
only to Appearance, but this would involve the separation of the
world of phenomena from the world of Spirit. 3. He concludes that
the solution offered by the spiritual philosophy of Plotinus is • that
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. o. 71.
2. » » " " II. p. 74
3. " " " » II. p. 79.
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the world is most adequately conceived under the form of
spiritual values, rather than under the form of commensurable
quantities. It is only when we think of ponderable quantities
that the delemna 'to be or not to be' leaves no escape.' 1.
This solution is in common with the general plan of Neoplatonism
that these difficulties will disappear as we reach a higher stage.
THE GREAT SPIRIT AND THE INDIVIDUAL SPIRITS.
In common with the hierarchical conception of reality, the
relation of The Great Spirit to individual spirits, is one of a
higher degree. The Great Spirit is the source of the particular
Spirits. 'Bach particular Spirit exists both in itself and in the
Great Spirit, and the Great Spirit exists in each of them as well
as in itself. The Great Spirit is the totality of Spirits in ac-
tuality, and each of them potentially. ' 2.
The Great Spirit is a manifestation of a still higher
reality which he holds is the ineffable Godhead. We know the
Godhead only as Spirit which is the God of Neoplatonism. This
sharing in the life of Spirit is 'except in rare moments of ec-
stasy 1 the highest degree of worship and spiritual joy to which
a human being can attain. He shows that the Plotinian doctrine
of Spirit is similar to the conception of communion with the
Logos-Christ of the Fourth Gospel. 'Such similes as that of the
vine and its branches, 'and such sayings as 'Abide in me, and I
in you, », illustrate the relation of the Great Spirit to other
Spirits in Neoplatonism. * 3. It is interesting to note here that
1. Philos. of Plotinus, Vol. II. o. SO.
2. Bnneads 6.2.20-22. Philos of " Plotinus .Vol. II .p. 32.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 33.
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the author emphasizes the point that Sou], in ascending to Spirit
loses itself. What it loses, is its individuality, personality
for he maintains that our highest life principle is supra-personal.
1. Yet he argues that there are 'differences', 'Qualitative dif-
ferentiations' which keep spiritual things from completely fusing.
He says, "These distinctions which do not involve separation, are
a good thing, because they add to the richness of the real world
which includes not only the diverse, but opposites." 2. He says
that the individual Spirit is the same life as the individual Soul,
'only transformed into the Divine image and liberated from all
baser elements. Individuality is maintained by 'something unique'
in each Spirit; but it is no longer a bar to complete communion
with all that is good, true, and beautiful in others. And this
state, so far from being a mere ideal, is the only true reality,
eternal and objectively true existence, the home of the Soul, which
has its citizenship in heaven .' 3.
It is in common with his conception of the relation of the
Universal Soul to particular Souls that Plotinus considers the
relation of the Great Spirit to particular Spirits. The Great
Spirit, or Universal Spirit, is above particular Spirits and con-
tains them all potentially. This is in common with his fluid con-
ception of reality and in common with his idea that the higher re-
lationships are supra-personal. By a process of mystical contem-
plation the Soul seems to escape to the higher realm of Spirit and
rises to what he considers the home of the Soul. It is on this
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. 1 1. d. 34.
2. « '• « » II. p. 84.
3. " » » " II.D.85.
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basis that Neoplatonisra seeks to be rid of personality, for the
Personalistic conception lays stress upon the personal as real
while Neoplatonism s eeks to escape to the realm of the impersonal,
or supra-personal.
THE ABSOLUTS
.
In his exposition of Plotinus 1 conception of the Absolute,
the author acknowledges in the beginning that Bradley is his guide.
He quotes Bradley to the effect that 'the relet ional f orm implies
a substantial totality beyond relations' 'Further, the ideas of
goodness, and of the beautiful, suggest in different ways the same
result. ..We gain from them the knowledge of a unity which transcends
and yet contains every manifold appearance. . .And the mode of union
in the abstract is actually given. 1 1. This conception of the
Absolute above all relations is in direct harmony with the system
of Plotinus and serves to emphasize again the position of the
writer that the hopes that Dean Inge has that Neoplatonisra will
again become the prevailing philosophy are very slender indeed.
The author explains that Plotinus follows Plato closely in
his treatment of dialectic. 'It is a science which enables us to
reason about each thing, to say what it is and how it differs from
others, what it has in common with them, where it is, whether it
really exists, to determine how many real beings there are, and
where not being is to be found instead of true being... It speaks
of all things scientifically and not according to simple ooinion...
It traverses the whole domain of the spiritual, and then by analy-
sis returns to its starting point'. 2. The author emphasizes the fact
1. Philos.of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 105 Note
Bradley's Appearance and Reali ty.p. 160
.
2. Philos.of Plotinus. Vol. II .p. 106.
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that for Plotinus, Dialectic is the study of first principles
which leads up to intuitive wisdom, that it passes through logic and
rises above it. Plotinus' dialectic 'rests when it has traversed
the whole domain of Spirit. • 1. He says that Plotinus like
Eckhart distinguishes between God and the Godhead. Thus in his
conception of the Godhead his position is that we know the Godhead
only as he reveals Himself as Spirit. "The God whom we commonly
worship is the revelation, not the revealer. The source and
ground of revelation cannot be revealed; the ground of knowledge
cannot be known. So the common source and ground of Goodness,
Truth, and Beauty must be beyond existence and beyond knowledge. "2
THE ABSOLUTE AS THE ONE.
By the One Plotinus does not mean the One in the numerical
sense. His conception is that of the whole that gives birth to
the parts. 'The One is the source from which the differentiation
of unity and plurality proceeds; it is the transcendence of separa-
bility rather than the negation of plurality. '3. He sees that
Plotinus seeks to escape the dualism of Spirit and Spiritual World
which he regards as inseparable, and each of which he regards as a
unity in duality. Thus he seeks the deeper unity lying back of
them which he regards as the One.
THE ONE AS BEYOND EXISTENCE.
According to the author, there are three principles that must
be remembered in considering the Absolute as beyond existence. (1)
'The nature of the Godhead is certainly unknown to us; we are un-
able to form any idea of the absolute and unconditioned. (2) It is
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II .p. 107
.
2- " »' » » II. p. 107.
3
-
" " " " II. p. 108.
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a principle of this philosophy that we are not cut off from the
highest form of life--the eternal and universal life of Spirit.
(3) We have in the mystical state, an experience of intuition
which is formless and indescribable, and which is therefore above
the spiritual world of Forms or Ideas." 1. He traces this doc-
trine from Eucleides of Megara who first identified the Good and
the One, who is also called God and Wisdom, through Plato to Plo-
tinus. Plato and Philo he regards as conceiving the Good as 'be-
yond Reality', 2, but not beyond being. Clement of Alexandria he
shows held the meaningless position that the God is beyond the One
and above the Monad. Origen held that divine inspiration was neces-
sary for knowledge of God. He quotes Augustine to the effect that
we can know what God is not but not what he is. Eregina follows
Plotinus in holding that the Absolute is beyond being and that in
the Absolute the three persona of the Trinity are fused. He
points out that Bckhart desires to refrain from denying being to
the Godhead yet he speaks of the Godhead as 'darkness'; the si-
lence'. 3.
The following selections from the Enneads which the author
quotes throw very little light upon the subject except to reveal
that Plotinus held that the Absolute is beyond Being, beyor.d all
attributes; "The One is beyond »\)*'^ , beyond activity, beyond
yoOs and • is ,an activity beyond v 9 and sense
and life.' 'We may call it First Activity, or First Potency. 1 It
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II .0 . 109
.
2. " « " IT. o.llO.
3. " " " " II o. 109-112.
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has no limit or boundary but is fundamentally infinite. • It is
'ineffable'. 'Will must not be ascribed to the Absolute, if Will
implies the desire for something not yet present. ' 'The One is
super-conscious, possessing immediate apprehension.* 'The Absolute
is all necessity as being subject to no necessity. 1 'Being abso-
lutely free, the One is the giver of freedom.' "The One does not
think but has self discernment, a kind of self-consciousness. 1
'That which is absolutely self-sufficing does not even need it-
self. • 'The One abides in a state of wakefulness 'beyond Being'. 1.
The author acknowledges the criticism as just that Plotinus,
after protesting that nothing can be said of the Absolute, tells
us a good deal about the Absolute even investing him with the at-
tribute of a personal God. This same criticism, he applies to
Spencer's Unknowable and to Hartmann's Unconscious. However, he
considers that the real question is whether the dialectic leads to
an Absolute 'beyond existence', and he shows that it does. He
concludes that Plotinus might have accepted the r>ra.ctical suggestion
that the God of practical religion is the Universal Soul, the God
of devout and thankful contemplation, the Great Spirit, the God of
our most inspired moments the Absolute. 2.
THE ONE AS INFINITE.
In this exposition, the author develops the idea that Neople-
tonism regards the One as fundamentally infinite and at the same
time Matter is spoken of as infinite. Thus he notes the danger of
the meeting of extremes such as exists in Spencer's Philosophy. He
seeks to overcome this difficulty by saying that if they are different
1. Enneads quoted Philos.of Plotinus.Vol.il p lis 114
2. Philos. f Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 116.
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it is because in the philosophy of Plotinus 'the One 1 has already
begun to differentiate himself, and Matter to receive forms. He
concludes that this is a region where discursive thought is no
longer adequate. He notes that Plotinus holds that to mount above
yo v s is to fall outside it and that Proclus holds that the ex-
tremes at top and bottom are simple but that the intermediate are
complex. 1. It seems that here is a weakness in Neoplatoni sm
that I do not think the author overcomes. Throughout the exposi-
tion has been regarded as the center of the system, as real.
Due to the overflow of the One, all of the lower orders of being
come into existence until we reach Matter which is regarded as
'not being*. In the upward climb of the soul each lower order is
regarded as matter for the higher until we reach the One which is
clearly regarded as 'beyond being'. Thus we have two extremes
both of which are abstractions. Waile Dean Inge denies that they
are the same, Matter and the One are viewed much in the same light.
As has been pointed out before, Plotinus does help us forward to
the phenomenal ity of matter yet in his system the relation of the
two extremes is not clear.
In his exposition of the idea of the infinite the author dis-
tinguishes between the fact of limit which he holds implies the
indefinite and the act of limiting which implies the infinite. 2.
He concludes that we know not the infinite, but the feet of the
infinite which is implied in the act of knowing. He distinguishes
between the Platonic conception of infinity which he holds is that
infinity suggests the absence of Form, which in all objects of
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.11 .p. 116-117
2- n ii. p . ii7.
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thought is an evil, and the common conception that ifiinity
asserts freedom from all limitations. Rothe, who denies that
infinity can be applied to God is quoted to the effect that Ab-
soluteness and infinitude are in no way identical conceptions,
his objection being that God is to be considered as outside of
space while infinitude is an idea which belongs to space. The
author concludes there is no harm in adopting Augus tines ex-
pression that God has his center everywhere and his circumference
nowhere. 1.
THE ONE AS FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL CAUSE.
He indicates that Plotinus clearly asserts the causality
of the Absolute. However, he explains that causality means
little more than the assertion of a hierarchy in Reality leading
up to an all embracing Absolute. He recognizes that Plotinus was
aware of the difficulty in showing how plurality can emanate from
unity, and Being from the super-essential. This problem is met
by Plotinus in his theory of creation. Here again we meet with
a difficulty that the author's exposition does not succeed in re-
moving. Creation for Plotinus is simply the overflow of the One.
The whole conception of emanation from the One which Dean Inge
shows is due to necessity, is a species of pantheism. 2. The
figure which Plotinus uses is that of 'the efflux of light and
heat from the sun which loses nothing in imparting itself. • 3.
In his footnote he classes the illustration as unfortunate in
that it is used by critics to discredit the theistic doctrine of
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. d. 117-118.
2. » » •« « II. d. 120.
3. * " II. p. 120.
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creation. 1. He holds that Plotinus' theory in some ways re-
sembles the Hegelian conception which makes the world necessary
to the Absolute, yet he repudiates this interpretation on the
basis that Plotinus does insist upon the complete independence of
the One. 2. The difficulty here is that Plotinus arrives at the
independence of the One only by a process of abstraction. He de-
nies that ' the infinite regress led Plotinus to take refuge in
a citadel beyond thought, on the basis that for Plotinus things in
time are not causes. He asserts, and rightly, that the Absolute
by the creation of a world wholly dependent upon itself does not
cease to be Absolute, but the difficulty is that by creation
Plotinus is upholding the theory of emanation on the basis of neces-
sity. 3. In this connection I think that Harnack's exposition is
much nearer the truth than the conception advanced by Dean Inge.
"The primeval Being is, as opposed to the many, the One; as op-
posed to the finite, the Infinite, the unlimited. It is the
source of all life, and therefore absolute causality and the only
real existence. It is, moreover the Good, in so far as all finite
things have their purpose in it, and ought to flow back to it.
But one cannot attach moral attributes to the original Being it-
self, because these would imply limitation. It has no attributes
of any kind; it is without magnitude, without life, without thought;
in strict propriety, indeed, we ought not to speak of it as existing;
it is "above existence", "above goodness". It is also active force
without a substratum; as active force the orimeval Being is per-
petually producing something else, without alteration, or motion,
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II . o. 120 .note
2. » » » " II. p. 121.
3. " « » " II.p.l2H21
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or diminution of itself. This production is not a physical
process, but an emission of force; and, since the product has
real existence only in virtue of the original existence working
in it, Neoplaton ism may be descrbed as a species of dynamic
pantheism." 1.
THE VISION OF THE ONE.
The ecstatic vision of the One is a conception upon which the
author lays a great deal of emphasis. Yet he seeks to develop the
conclusion that ecstasy is not an important r>art of the system of
Plotinus. In his denial that ecstasy is an important part of this
system, he makes the statement that 'ecstasy has been thrust into
the foreground and exaggerated as Western critics of Buddhism have
exaggerated the importance of Nirvana. 1 He reaches the conclusion
that in both cases the doctrines have been exaggerated. 2. It is
interesting to note, however, that he devotes some thirty- two
pages to his exposition of this topic, and that the impression
throughout is such as to lead one to the directly opposite conclu-
sion.
He lays down as the ultimate doctrine of Neoplatonic meta-
physics that we can know the unknowable, 'because in our deepest
ground we are the unknowable. 1 3. It is his conception that only
by aspiring love can the Spirit become that which it can never
know , the absolute Ground of all being. In this ecstatic experience
thinker and thought are so identified that both knowledge and con-
sciousness are lost. 4. The terms used to express the aim of this
1. Harnack. Article Neoplatonism. Ency.Brit.14 Ed.
Vol.16, p. 218.
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. if. p. 159
.
3- » » " II. p. 132.
4
*
" " "
" II. p. 132.
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experience are "vision" or "immediate ar^orehension" yet he
avows that these and any other words are inadequate to express
what they aim at. 1. This exposition reminds one of the slang
expression, current a few years ago which was to the effect that
one may have a feeling of an inward inexpressi bility of an out-
ward all-over- ishness.
The following selections, from the copious quotations from
the Bnneads which the author gives, serve to give us some little
understanding of what this ecstatic experience meant for Plotinus:
"But we must go higher, for many other reasons and especially be-
cause the principle which we seek is the Absolute which is inde-
pendent of all things ... That which makes being and independence
is not in itself being and independence, but above both. . .For
although it permeates all Truth, and therefore the Truth of which we
participate, nevertheless it escapes us when we try to speak of it
or even to think of it. For the discursive reason, if it wishes
to say anything, must seize first one element of the Truth and then
another; such are the conditions of discursive thought. But how
can discursive thought apprehend the absolutely simple? It is
enough to apprehend it by a kind of spiritual apprehension. But
in this act of apprehension we have neither the power nor the time
to say anything about it; afterwards we can reason about it. We
may believe that we have really seen, when a sudden light illumines
the soul; for this light comes from the One and is the One.... For
that which we seek to behold is the light which gives us light,
even as we can only see the sun the light of the sun. How then
can this come to us? Strip thyself of everything. 2.
1. Fhilos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 132.
2. Bnneads. 5. 3.1. quoted Philos^of Plotinus.Vol.il
.p. 134
.

-90-
"The Soul must remove from itself good and evil and every-
thing else, that it may receive the One alone, as the One is alone.
When the Soul is so blessed, and is come to it, or rather when it
manifests its presence, when the Soul turns away f rom visible
things and makes itself beautiful as possible and becomes like the
One; (the manner of preparation and adornment is known to those who
practise it) and seeing the One suddenly appearing in itself, for
there is nothing between, nor they any longer two, but one; for you
cannot distinguish between them while the vision lasts; it is that
union of which the union of earthly lovers, who wish to blend their
being with each other, is a copy." 1.
"It does not call the object of its vision Spirit, although
it has itself been transformed into Spirit before the vision and
lifted up into the abode of Spirits. When the Soul arrives at the
intuition of the One, it leaves the mode of spiritual perception.. .
For when the Spirit is inebriated with the nectar, it falls in
love, in simple contentment and satisfaction; and it is better
for it to be so intoxicated than to be too proud for such intoxi-
cation." 2.
"If so the Soul must forsake all that is external and turn
itself wholly to that which is within; it will not allow itself
to be distracted by anything external, but will ignore them all,
as at first by not attending to them, so now last by not seeing
them; it will not even know itself; and so it will come to the
vision of the One and will be united with it; and then, after a
1. Bnneads 6.7.34. quoted Philos.of Plotinus.
Vol. II. p. 133.
2. Bnneads 6.7.35. quoted Philos.of Plotinus.
Vol. II. p. 135.
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sufficient converse with it, it will return and bring word, if
i t be possible, to others of its heavenly intercourse." 1.
He likens Souls to a choir of singers who stand around a con-
ductor who, 'when they look at the conductor sing well and are
really with him. So we move round the One; if we did not we
should be dissolved and no longer exist; but we do not always
look towards the One. When we do, we attain the end of our exis-
tence, and our repose, and we no longer sing out of tune, but
form in very truth a divine chorus round the One... In this choral
dance the Soul sees the fountain of Spirit, the source of Being,
the cause of Good, the root of Soul. These do not flow out of the
One in such a way as to diminish it; for we are not dealing with
material quantities, else the products of the One would be perish-
able, whereas they are eternal, because their source remains not
divided among them but constant. Therefore, the products too are
permanent, as the light remains while the sun remains." 2.
Of the mystical experience he says, "Then we can see Him and
ourselves, as far as is permitted: we see ourselves glorified, full
of spiritual light, or rather we see ourselves as pure, subtle,
ethereal, light; we become divine, or rather we know ourselves to
be divine. Then indeed is the flame of life kindled, that flame
which, when we sink back to earth, sinks with us.". 3.
Of this vision and the relation of the Soul to the One he
says: "But in the vision that which sees is not reason
but something greater than and prior to reason, something presup-
1. Bnneads 6.9.7. quoted Philos.of Plotinus. Vol . II .p. 137
.
2. » 2.9.7. " mm h w ii. p . 139.
3. " 2.9.7. » » " « » II. p. 141.
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posed by reason, as is the object of vision. He who then sees
himself, when he sees will see himself as a simple being, will
be united to himself, as such, will feel himself become such.
We ought not even to say that he will see , but he will be that
which he sees, if indeed it is possible any longer to distinguish
seer and seen, and not boldly to affirm that the two are one.
In this state the seer does not see or distinguish or imagine
two things; he becomes another, he ceases to be himself and to
belong to himself. He belongs to Him and is one with Him, like
two concentric circles; they are one when they coincide, and two
only when they are separated. It is only in this sense that the
Soul is other. Therefore this vision is hard to descrihe, for
how can one describe, as other than oneself, that which, when one
saw it, seemed to be one with oneself." 1.
Of this relation of the Soul to the One he says: "It ceases
to be Being; it is above Being, while in communion with the One.
If then a man sees himself become one with the One, he has in
himself a likeness of the One, and if he passes out of himself,
as an image to its archetype, he has reached the end of his jour-
ney. And when he comes down from his vision, he can againawaken
the virtue that is in him, and seeing himself fitly adorned in
every part he can again mount upward through virtue to Spirit,
and through wisdom to the One itself. Such is the life of gods
and godlike and blessed men; a liberation from all earthly bonds,
a life that takes no pleasure in earthly things, a flight of the
alone to the Alone." 2.
1. Enneads 2.9.7. quoted Philos. of Plotinus. Vol
. II. p. 141.
2. " 6.9.7. « " » « II. p. 143.
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In commenting upon these and many similar quo tations from
the Bnneads the author seeks to bring out the point that Plotinus
was cautious about asserting the complete union of the Soul with
the One in the mystical experience. He auotes Arnou upon this
point to the effect that Plotinus was fond of inserting qualifyhg
phrases with regard to this matter of complete union. 1. In spite
of the footnotes to the contrary, one is inclined to the belief
that Dean Inge does not make a clear case for Plotinus in this
matter of absorption into the One. In such statements as the
following taken from the preceding quotations it looks as though
Schwegler's word concerning 'swooning into the Absolute and
mystical absorption into the One, is very near the truth. 3. 'It
will not even know itself; and so it will come to the vision of
the One and will be united with it. • 'And seeing the One suddenly
appearing in itself, for there is nothing between, nor are they
any longer two, but one. ' 'If a man sees himself become one with
the One, he has in himself a likeness of the One, and if he passes
out of himself, as an image to its archetype, he has reached the
end of his journey. ' In his remarks concerning this mystical ex-
perience the author goes so far as to say, "The Spirit becomes
for a moment that which it can never know , the absolute Ground of
all being." 3. It seems that there is good ground for the inter-
pretation that the experience Plotinus is describing means nothing
1. Arnou. Footnote Philos.of Plotinus. Vol. II .p . 141
.
2. Schwegler, Hist, of Philos. p. 140.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 132.
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less tlian mystical absorption into the One.
In his statement, already quoted to the effect that ecstasy
is no important part of Plotinus • system, one is inclined to be-
lieve that the author is inconsistent. He takes the oosition that
Plotinus does claim to give us a real metaphysics of mysticism. In
his comment here he commends Plotinus in that he has put the vision
of the One in its right place at the apex of the pyramid which as-
cends, as the dialectic guides us, from the many and discordant
to the One. 1. Again this same position is emphasized in his state-
ment tioat 'we can laiow the unknowable and that this is the ultimate
ground of Neoplatonic metaphysics. 2. Indeed his whole exposi-
tion leads one to the conclusion that the dialectic carries us up
to the Spirit and through Spirit and by the help of the mystical
experience arrives at the One. He says that Plotinus refuses to
separate the intellectual from the moral and the mystical, and that
they begin to join long before our journey's end. 3. Indeed one is
forced to the conclusion that the mystical trance is one of the
distinctive parts of Plotinus' system.
In fairness to the author's exposition, we must note that he
bases his conclusion that ecstasy is unimportant in Plotinus' system
upon the fact that for Plotinus and his follwers it was a rare ex-
perience. 4. We must agree that this statement is true but it is
also true that the reason that the experience was rare was because
of the method he followed. For him the mystical state occurs only
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 145.
2. « « « " II. o. 132.
3. " " " I I. p. 107.
4. " " " « II. p. 153.

-35-
as a sequel to a prolonged period of intense mental concentration,
turning of the thoughts within. This was possible, of course only
to a few and readily accounts for the fact that it was re re. How-
ever, we must conclude that rareness does not lessen the fact of
its importance.
It is interesting in this connection that he absolves
Plotinus from any trace of self-hypnotisation such as is found among
Oriental mystics who hypnotise themselves by gazing at some bright
object. He does make the concession however, that the intense
abstraction and concentration of thought may doubtless have the
same result as protracted gazing upon some chosen object. 1. Here
again it seems the difference is in method only. It seems that
one might be justified in accounting for the theurgy of later Neo-
platonists on the basis that they were seeking the seme results
but by easier methods. Although the author would regard later
Neoplatonism as a corruption of Plotinus* teaching, after all re
must conclude that with Plotinus they regarded the mystical ex-
perience as an important part of the system.
In considering this exposition of Plotinus' teaching regarding
the Absolute one is forced to conclude that here again is proof
that his hope that Neoplatonism may become the prevailing philoso-
phy rests upon a very flimsy basis. His Absolute is an abstraction
e„nd nothing else. In many ways Bradley's Absolute is similar to
that of Plotinus. Bradley proceeds to reduce everything to appeer-
ance and finally resolves everything into an Absolute out of all re-
lation. 2. He reaches this conclusion by a process of abstraction.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.1 1. p. 154.
2. Bradley. Appearance & Reality, p. 486.

-86-
Plotinus reaches the same conclusion but he uses the mystical
swoon to reach the One, an Absolute eaually above relations,
qualities, in fact supra- everything. When one remembers that the
positivism of Comte and the later reactions of James* Pragmatism
came into prominence as a direct protest against such systems one sees
little ground indeed for the author's hope that we may return to
Plot inus.
Throughout his exposition, it is clear that the One for
Plotinus is impersonal. 1. Reality conceived of as personal is
the •bete noire* of all such systems. Indeed it is just here that
the philosophy of Personal ism is making its strongest contribu-
tion in insisting that personality is the key to reality and that
any other approach to the problems of change and identity of time
and eternity must involve one in meaningless abstractions of the
absolute idealists or the agnosticism of Comte and his successors.
Dean Albert C. Khudson holds that the three main positions
with regard to the Absolute are as follows: the agnostic/ regards
the Absolute as unknowable; the Logical view/ regards the Absolute
as the All, the position since Hegel; the Causal view, regards the
Absolute as the ultimate Ground of the World 2. This latter view
may be said to reoresent the Personalis tic t>osition. In this
/
/
view God and the Absolute are regarded as identical, that is, God
or Absolute is not conceived as the Logical All but as the ulti-
mate Ground of the world. In this connection, Professor Bright-
man in contrasting the position of what he calls absolutism with
that of Personalism, points out that for absolutism, (absolute
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I I. p. 131.
2. Conference notes.
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idealism) God is all that there is; for personalism, God is not
all there is, human persons are no part of Him. It is his
position that in finite selves God wills the existence of what is
genuinely other than himself; so tncct the universe is ultimately a
society of selves, not a single self. He points out that both
systems hold that the unity and the plurality of the universe
alike depend upon the Absolute Self; hut absolutism swallows up
the plurality in the unity, while oersonalism holds that the facts
demand a real plurality dependent for its being on the unity, yet
not wholly determined in detail by the unity. 1.
The position of Professor Marlatt is that of typical per-
sonalism. In his exposition of the idea of "person" he says that
it provides anidea of person under which God may conceivably be
personal wi thout impairing the Absoluteness, Oneness, Omni-presence
,
and Omnipotence which have been, and should be, attributed to Him. 2
In tnis connection it is interesting to note that Dean Inge
is unequivocal in his utter condemnation of pluralists who advo-
cate the idea of a limited struggling God, who does his best to
overcome insuperable obstacles. He says, "This dualism corresponds
to the attitude of the pure moralist, who is occupied in combating
evil without trying to account for it; but it is intolerable both
for philosophy and for religion." 3. His position here i s in di-
rect opposition to James and Wells who uphold the idea of a finite
God, but Dean Inge is equally opposed to the personalistic view.
In this strife between the extreme pluralists and the absolutists,
Personalism takes the mediating view holding to a limited pluralism
and to a basal monism conceived in terms of personality.
1. Brightman. An introduction to Philos. d.246.
2. Marlatt. What is a Person? Boston University Bulletin.
Vol. XIV.May 25, 19S5.No. 15.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 235.
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It seems to me that the personal! s tic conception of the
Absolute world Ground as personal comes much nearer to gripping
the real problem than does the idea of a super-Dersonal Absolute
wnich is nothing less than a mere abstraction. It is the position
of personalists that the World Ground conceived as impersonal,
necessarily involves one in abstractions that mystify rather than
clarify. This fact alone is enough to convince one that the
author's hopes that we may return to the philosophy of Plotinus,
rest upon a very insecure basis.
ETHICS & RELIGION.
The author develops the point that the connection of ethics
with metaphysics became closer and closer throughout the history
of Greek thought and that in the last stage the fusion is almost
complete. He quotes Eucken to the effect that it is the special
glory of Christianity that its ethics are metaphysical and its
metaphysics ethical. This he holds is likewise true of Neopla-
tonism. 1.
In his exposition of the ethics of Neoplatonism he brings
out the specific points as follows: Plotinus considers the prac-
• tice of political virtues as preceding the first stage of purifi-
cation. Purification for him means to detach the Soul from the
body and to elevate it to the spiritual world. This is achieved
by keeping the body under by the practice of asceticism, a certain
flight from the world in order to liberate the soul. This asceticism
was not of an extreme form. "He would have us live so simply that
our bodily wants are no interruption to our mental and spiritual
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II .p. 154
.
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interests." 1. He acknowledges the weakness of Plotinus in
his lack of aporeciation of the body. Plotinus seemed to be
ashamed of his body, refusing to have his portrait painted. A
proper regard for the body equally with a proper regard for the
spirit is wanting in his thought. 2. He develops the idea that
Plotinus held that the process of emancipation was a struggle
against darkness rather than against a hostile spiritual power.
He held the interesting view that 'vice is still human, being
mixed with something contrary to itself. • This he points out
rests upon nis mystical doctrine that there remains a spark of the
Divine in man which never consents to evil. 3.
The next stage above purification is that of enlightenment.
This is the stage occupied by philosophers whi ch s tage , the author
considers, was regarded by Plotinus and his predecessors as morally
the highest. 4. This stage of contemplation he regards as above
that of active philanthropy. He makes clear the point that for
Plotinus contemplation was no idle self enjoyment, but the inter-
play of Spirit and the spiritual world. 5. He notes the error in
the Plotinian ethics in that he supposed that humble occupations
are a bar to the highest life. He further notes that this error
which Greek thought never outgrew had not a little to do with the
decay of Greek culture. 6.
The highest stage that of unification, the author regards as
hardly belonging to ethics. He quotes Plotinus to the effect that
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 167
.
2. » II. p. 171.
3. " II. p. 172.
4. » » » » I I. p. 177.
5. II. p. 181.
8. » » II. p. 190.
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there is progress in heaven, and that Love is an activity of the
Soul desiring the Good. This higher Love he regards not as a re-
lation between externals "but between Spirit and Spirit. He says
that it is unity in duality, the reconciliation of these opposites,
known in experience. 1. This position with regard to the mystical
relation with the One nas been considered previously and found un-
satisfactory. He arrives at this conception of unity in duality
only by positing the One above all relations. This of course is the
conclusion reached by Absolute idealists and has been considered as
inadequate on the basis that such a unity is a bare abstraction
and does not give any insight into the problem.
He notes another defect in the Neoplatonic ethics and that
is the moral isolation of the Neoplatonic Saint. He says that in
Plotinus we find no ideas of corporate penitence and atoning sym-
pathy. This he regards as a defect that is a fatal bar to under-
standing and solving any social or moral problem. 2. In his
previous discussion he notes that Plotinus here was following the
Greek ideal in his desire to be invulnerable, and therefore he
undervalued the need of human sympathy. He sees here the contrast
between the Christian ideal of emancipation by sympathy and the
Stoical ideal of emancipation by perfect inner detachment. Of
course the superiority of the Christian ideal cannot be overes-
timated. 3.
Here again we have evidence of the failure of Neoplatonism
which the author readily acknowledges. He is careful to emphasize
the close relationship between ethics and metaphysics and yet he
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.11, d.188.
2. » h n. p . 191.
3
* "
"
" " II. p. 174-175.
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does not seem to sense the point that the errors in Neoplatonic
ethics are the direct result of an inferior conception of reality.
Certainly the ethics of Personalisra are much more in line with the
higher Christian conception and just so because of a truer under-
standing of the nature of reality.
In his religious conceptions the author explains that in
Plotinus there is much crude spiritism. He makes room for the
gods of popular worship and likewise, holds that the sun and stars
are divine beings and that the world is the 'third god 1 . This he
regards as due to an inherited tradition which he could not cast
off. 1. He shows that Plotinus held that the higher soul alone
was exempt from magic and sorcery but that the irrational soul
was not. This opened the way to an encouragement of witchcraft
and helped to elevate superstition into a dogma. 2.
The author explains that Plotinus' conception of prayer was
that of approaching the higher spiritual powers by contemplation
and meditation without making requests. However, he believes that
the lower spirits are amenable to petitions, this kind of prayer
being a branch of sympathetic magic. However, the point is em-
phasized that true prayer for Plotinus consists in the unspoken
yearnings of the Soul for a closer walk with God, and that the
object of prayer is to become one with the Being who is addressed. 3.
In this connection he explains the sphere of the Divine to include
the One, Spirit, and Universal Soul. In addressing prayers, there
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. d. 195-197
2. " " » » II. p. 200-201.
3. » » » « II. p. 201-202.
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are distinctions between the three Divine Hypostases. Thus he
concludes that if our minds turn towards anything in space or
time for which we hope, we address the Universal Soul. When
praying for Spiritual progress, knowledge of God, heaven, we ad-
dress the Great Spirit. Then again by means of the mystical
trance, rapt into ecstasy we shall hope that we are in communion
with the One— the Godhead. The author makes the personal observa-
tion that we envisage God under these three aspects in prayers,
and offers the interesting suggestion that we might classify
theologians under the three heads, namely, those who worship the
Soul of humanity, or the Soul of the world; those who worship the
Lord of the eternal and spiritual realmj and those who aporoach
the ineffable Godhead. Ke considers it a strong point that Ploti-
nus has room for all three, and that he shows how we may pass from
one mode of worship to the other. 1.
He discusses the criticism of Neoplatonisra in comparison
with Christianity that is offered by Eucken. The main points of
this criticism are as follows: That which unites Plotinus with
Hellenism must separate him from Christianity. He emphasizes this
point that Plotinus follows the Hellenic tradition in asserting the
co-ordination of humanity with the All, the soul life and even the
deification of natural forces, the expectation of happiness from
active conduct, the high estimation of thought and knowledge as
the Divine spark in man. He notes that in both are found uncom-
promising inwardness and drawing to God by renunciation of the
world. He notes that Plotinus finds this inwardness in an imper-
sonal spirituality, while Christianity finds it in a development
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. t>. 204.
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of the personal life. Again he shows that in Neoplatonism
salvation comes from the oower of thought, in Christianity it
comes from sincerety of heart. He says, "In Plotinus we find
an abandonment of the first world, a fading of time in the light
of eternity, a repose in view of the Whole. In Christianity we
find an entrance of the eternal into time, a world-historical
movement, a power working against the irrationality of the actual.
In the former we have a disappearance of man before the endlessness
of the All; in the latter, a transposition of man and humanity into
the central point of the All. In the former, an isolation of the
thinker on the heights of contemplation of the world; in the latter
a close welding together of individuals in full community of life
and sorrow." 1. In this connection Bucken finds a contradiction
in Neoplatonism between the doctrine of inwardness and the imper-
sonality of the world of which man is a part.
He considers the criticism of Baron von Hugel who finds in-
consistency between Plotinus the metaphysician and Plotinus the
saint and who claims that in Plotinus* philosoohy God is exiled
from the world and the world from him. 2.
In answering these criticisms the author has very little to
say with regard to Bucken's statement except that he charges
Bucken with overemphasizing the intellectualism of Plotinus. 3.
Indeed it is my opinion that Bucken's criticism cannot be answered.
He points out differences that are fundamental, such as the imper-
sonal spirituality of Plotinus, the deification of natural forces,
1. Bucken. Lebensanschauungen Grosser Denker
quoted Philos.of Plotinus Vol. II .p. 205-206.
2. Philos.of Plotinus Vol . II .p. 206.
3. » » " » II. p. 206.
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the disappearance of man before the All, the isolation of the
Neoplatonic saint. These differences cannot be reconciled and
point to the conclusion that has been stated before, that Neoplatonisra
cannot win the attention of the world. The author holds that
Baron von Hiigel follows French critics who regard the method of
abstraction of 'peeling the onion' as the characteristic instru-
ment of Plotinian dialectic. He says that the spiritual world is
the home of the Soul for Plotinus and that this is the conclusion
of his dialectic. 1. He is insistent that in Plotinus' philosophy
and religion there is no contradiction. It seems to me that the
charge of abstraction is one that Neoplatonism cannot escape. In
both philosophy and religion the element of abstraction is so in-
nerent that this alone would preclude the possibility of Neopla-
tonism becoming the prevailing philosophy.
The author considers the Criticism of Augustine and regards
his statement as just. He found everything in Neoolatonism ex-
cept the doctrine of the Incarnation. "Eut that 'he came unto his
own, and his own received him not; but as many as received him, to
them gave he power to become sons of God, even to them that believe
on his name' this I could not find there... But that 'the Logos
was made flesh and dwelt among us '--this I found not there. I
could discover in these books, though expressed in other and vary-
ing phrases, that 'the Son was in the form of the Father, and
thought it not roboery to be equal with God', because by na-
ture he was the same substance. But that 'he emptied himself,
taking upon him the form of a servant ... .and became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross ,'... these books do not contain. "2.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 207.
2. Augustine, quoted Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II .p. 208.

-95-
This criticism he regards as legitimate so that we may conclude
that religion for Dean Inge means Neoplatonism with the doctrine
of the Incarnation added. There is one point, however, which he
regards as a real weakness and that is that the Greeks emphasized
the independence and invulnerability of man. He considers that
this precludes the possibility of self surrender, and also emphasis
upon the fact that man needs his fellows. 1. This weakness in
Plotinian ethics was considered before and the conclusion reached
was that it rests upon the fundamental defect in Neoplatonism, in
that it insists that reality must be conceived in impersonal terms.
There is very little prospect indeed, that Neoplatonism has vitality
enough to enable it to appeal to this age. Our interest in it must
remain largely historical.
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
In making a concluding summary of Dean Inge's exposition of
the Philosophy of Plotinus the following points stand out in favor
of his view as to the importance of Neoplatonism. His conclusion
as to the importance of Neoplatonism to the student who would un-
derstand traditional Christianity is undoubtedly c orrect. Neopla-
tonism did exert a tremendous influence through the pseudo-Dionysius
Clement, Origen, Augustine and Scotus Erigena. These great names
suggest that that influence has been far reaching; in fact, the
modern churches that strongly emphasize the traditional element,
are still strongly under that influence. It remains to be pointed
out however, that the main interest of the student must be historical
rather than that we find it possessing a conquering vitality such
as Dean Inge seems to discover.
1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol
. II .p. 209
.
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Another point is in direct harmony with the above conclusion
and that is that the contributions of Neoplatonism in the field of
philosophy are important but that they also are to be appreciated
from the standpoint of historical development. Neoplatonism does
help us forward to a clearer understanding of the phenomenali ty of
matter but as has been explained his conception is by no means
clear of difficulties.
Still another emphasis of Neoplatonism is important and that
is the advance made by Plotinus in stressing the immateriality of
the Soul. His ability to distinguish clearly between the body and
the Soul was a real contribution to a better understanding of the
problem and laid a foundation that makes for a firmer ground for
our belief in immortality. Here again, however, we must note that
his lack of appreciation .of personality is a defect. His emphasis
upon the impersonal and super-personal makes it impossible that
his conceptions should prevail to any very great degree today.
Another point that needs to be emphasized is that Plotinus
is important for those who would understand Mysticism in its his-
torical development. It seems that here is the author's chief in-
terest in Plotinus. His emphasis upon the mystical will always
appeal to certain minds. It is very doubtful however, if the
world will adopt his metaphysics of mysticism. Beyond a certain
practical emphasis mysticism will always prove distasteful to
multitudes. Indeed, the preponderance of abstractions in Neopla-
tonic philosophy makes his emphasis upon the mystical seem only
natural. I think that we must agree with Professor Jones when he
says that "negative" philosophy is no proper or inherent part of
mysticism. He says, "It belongs to a long and tragic stage of
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human thinking. I do not want to do anything to Derpetuate it.
I want to transcend its abstract reality by substituting for it
a reality that is self communicative and concrete. . -He is a being,
not of abstractness and negations, but of character and purpose. "1.
We can readily agree with Harnack in his estimate of Neopla-
tonism that never before in the Greek and Roman theory of the world
did the conviction of the dignity of man and his elevation above
nature attain so certain an expression as in Neoplatonism . We can
accept his conclusion that the ethical emphasis which Neoplatonism
sought to beget and confirm, was the highest and purest which the
culture of the ancient world produced. We must also agree with
him that as a philosophy and as a religion, Neoplatonism utterly
failed. 3.
In considering the weaknesses of Neoplatonism, the following
points need to be emphasized; In the first place, as has been main-
tained throughout this paper, Neoplatonism is in error in its con-
ception of the fundamental nature of reality. No impersonal con-
ception of reality that necessarily lands one in abstractions, can
ever hope to become the prevailing conception. On this basis as
has been explained, Neoplatonism can never solve the problem of
unity and plurality, time and eternity. The only escape is that
of positing abstractions. On the other hand, the Personalis tic
approach, that personality furnishes the key to reality, goes far
toward understanding these problems and at the same time avoids
the pitfall of such conceptions as the One, the Absolute beyond
all relations.
1. Jones. Some Exponents of Mystical Religion. p. 115.
2. Harnack. History of Dogma. Vol. I. p. 336 f.
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Another weakness in the Neoplatonic system is his doctrine
of emanation on the basis of necessity. This must necessarily
involve one in a species of pantheism. As has been explained by
Harnack 1, there is a strain of pantheism running through the
system. On the other hand, Dean Inge does not succeed in re-
moving the difficulty in connection with the conception of the
One as transcendent and Matter as 'not being'. It is on this basis
that Harnack, Bucken, and Caird charge Plotinus with metaphysical
dualism. 2. It naturally follows from his error in metaphysics
as to tne nature of reality that his ethics should prove faulty.
This has been stressed in the paper and has also been acknowledged
by Dean Inge. 3. His hope seems to be to graft the ethics of
Christianity upon the stem of Neoplatonic philosophy. It seems
clear, however, that the fundamental error of Neoplatonism in
stressing the impersonal can never furnish a basis for modern be-
lief. Christianity certainly stresses the personal both in man
and in Deity.
In his exposition of the Religion of Neoplatonism it does
not seem that the author makes a clear case. ?7hat was said con-
cerning the emphasis upon the impersonal comes in here. His
conception of worship is largely that of contemplation, medita-
tion — with special stress upon the intellectual. It does not
seem reasonable that a system that finally ended with the incor-
poration of theurgy would be able to escane this same fate again.
The fact that the vision of the One seems to stand at the center
1. Harnack. History of Dogma. Vol. I. p. 339.
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol I. p. 13-18 f.
3. t II. p. 207-208.
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of his religious conception is not an unmitigated evil but
the fact that this vision is realized only in the mystical
swoon into the One certainly will not appeal very strongly to
this age.
My conclusion is that Neoplatonism is not a living philoso-
phy. Its importance for us is historical. It belongs to the
past rather than to the living present.
Russell Bigelow Lisle
38 Burtt Street,
Lowell, Massachusetts.
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